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ABSTRACT 
Building Dupont: Capitalism, Manufactures, and 
Place in Early America, 1800-1820 
 
by 
Christopher Manning 
Dr. Greg Hise, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of History 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
 
Though there is a rich literature dealing with the DuPont Company, the 
historiography remains dedicated to studies of the family’s life, corporate methods, 
working-class culture, and technological know-how. Rarely do studies engage the 
company’s wider economic position or regional influence in early America. This study 
analyzes the way early American culture guided and influenced DuPont’s growth and 
success. It also examines the company’s efforts to promote manufactures, create markets, 
and shape its surrounding landscape. As in other parts of the world, the development of 
industrial capitalism, and the wider acceptance of domestic manufacturers and large-scale 
industry in the United States accelerated the emergence of factory towns, milling villages, 
and long-term urban growth. The DuPont Company and its founder E.I. du Pont played 
an instrumental role in these developments and helped determine their specifically 
American characteristics. Furthermore, this thesis asserts that the environment in and 
around Wilmington shaped DuPont’s early development, and that the firm was 
instrumental in organizing the economic, social, and physical world around it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 “The Wisdom of the world has been, and is fairly attainable by us, as by other 
industrious and qualified nations, and the inventive genius of the people of the United 
States has produced a very great number of curious and valuable instruments and 
machines.”  
 
Tench Coxe1 
 
In A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures Tench Coxe addressed two fundamental 
sentiments shared by many in America’s early republic. First, that wisdom, knowledge, 
and understanding were all obtainable to the United States’ industrious population. 
Second, that this industrious spirit led to valuable creations and new tools with which to 
engage the world. But these words, and others throughout this work, also imply that 
collecting wisdom and creating these tools was some form of destiny or purpose for the 
American people. It was something that they should achieve, or better yet, something 
they were meant to achieve more so than any other peoples. “It would have been a mine 
of wealth, lost to the country,” Coxe wrote, “if the talent to invent the invaluable saw gin, 
to prepare cotton for the manufacturer’s card, had not been exerted, and if the inventive 
and fabricating powers of our citizens minds and bodies had not been applied to steam 
energy.”2 Americans were hardworking, vigilant people, and in the newly United States it 
was their job to invent, produce, and improve. Those who did none of these things were 
depleting their own fortunes, and worse, diminishing national wealth.  
In America’s early national period—roughly between 1789 and 1830—statements 
like these were tied to economic growth and development. In the decades after the 
Revolution, politicians and citizens throughout the country discussed and debated 
 
1 Tench Coxe, A Statement of the Arts and Manufactures for the year 1810 (Philadelphia: Cornman, 1814) 
Early American Imprints Series II: Shaw-Shoemaker, 1801-1819 (Accessed: October 25, 2009),49. 
2 Coxe, A Statement of the Arts, 50. 
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potential directions for the newly independent economy, all while making individual 
economic choices. Historian Lance Banning suggests that the Founding Fathers had 
distinctive views about the economic policies “necessary to secure a permanent 
foundation for the nation’s freedom.”3 The Founders, however, were not the only 
individuals with strong opinions on how to direct the national economy. Planters, 
farmers, manufacturers, laborers, and other ordinary citizens all held strong feelings 
about how to secure freedom and national stability. For one example, some manufactures 
envisioned “a nation of producers,” that could withdraw from world-trade altogether and 
avoid draining specie from the national coffers.4 This was in sharp contrast to the 
internationalist sentiments that permeated post-Revolutionary War discussions about the 
economy. Statesmen such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison envisioned a national 
economy tied to free international trade. They labored to open overseas markets and 
counteract American dependence on British trade. In contrast to Jefferson’s and 
Madison’s Anglophobia, Alexander Hamilton, while also focusing on the international 
arena, hoped to link economic growth to revenues earned from British imports. 
 Different economic preferences gained traction in specific localities like cities and 
hinterlands, or the American North and South. In the South, plantation households 
organized the economy and society by directing slave or wage labor and facilitating 
market exchange. In Manhattan, as limited real estate became a valuable commodity, 
investors and businessmen increasingly gained control over a scarce housing market and 
 
3 Lance Banning, “Political Economy and the Creation of the Federal Republic,” in Devising Liberty: 
Preserving and Creating Freedom in the New American Republic, ed. David Thomas Konig (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1995), 11-12. 
4 Lawrence Peskin, Manufacturing Revolution: The Intellectual Origins of Early American Industry 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), 6. 
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placed political power in the hands of a few prominent landowners.5 The point is that 
there was no clear consensus, no one direction and no one dominating endeavor or 
activity that defined the antebellum economy.  
Despite these differing and often competing viewpoints in the nation’s early years, 
nearly all of these groups desired some form of economic growth and national 
development.6 As capitalist behavior took hold, many seemed to share Coxe’s sentiment 
that a mine of wealth should not be wasted. The chapters that follow consider the 
emergence of domestic industries in this economic arena. Specifically, they ask how a 
nationalizing and capitalist economic culture motivated the actions of manufactures, and 
how those producers defended the significance of their productions. They also analyze 
the contributions of industrialists to national development through the creation and 
 
5 A good work on the Southern economy is Jack P. Greene, Pursuits of Happiness: The Social Development 
of Early Modern British Colonies and the Formation of American Culture (Chapel Hill: The University of 
North Carolina Press, 1988); and for Manhattan, Elizabeth Blackmar, Manhattan for Rent 1785-1850 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). 
6 Economic growth commonly refers to an increase in the productive capacity of an economy. This might 
apply to individuals, groups, or entire societies that increase output and trade through such methods as 
product specialization, a division of labor, or the application of new technologies that allow a fixed input to 
yield a larger output. See, Robert B. Eklund, Jr. and Robert D. Tollison, Microeconomics: Private Markets 
and Public Choice, Sixth Edition (Addison Wesley Longman, Inc., 2000), 32-33.  Historian Douglass North 
further explains economic growth in the context of early national America. He argues that economic 
growth must begin with a successful trade in exports, because initially domestic markets are small and 
scattered. An expanding external market will therefore encourage general economic growth by increasing 
the number of producers and consumers participating in exchange. This growth provides for an “increase in 
the size of the domestic market, growth in money income, and the spread of specialization and division of 
labor,” which encourages future growth and development. Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth of the 
United States, 1790-1860 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1966), 1-3. National and economic 
development also requires an explanation. My use of “development” in this thesis defers to historian and 
cultural theorist Raymond Williams’ description of developed land as that which has been utilized or 
harvested for its natural resources. These resources are then used to benefit the ends of a particular society. 
The actual development of a place might imply the construction of buildings, roads, storage facilities, or 
other features that help facilitate economic and social connection or even agricultural plots that yield 
sustenance for society. Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Revised 
Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, 1983), 102-104. Development is also a process that 
yields things, as Jane Jacob asserts, rather than representing a mere collection of things. Jane Jacobs, The 
Nature of Economies (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 31-33. Economic development can therefore be 
explained as the process of creating products from resources based on a society’s definition of value. These 
products are then exchanged in national or international markets. When development increases along with 
the volume of exchange an economy grows. 
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expansion of markets and the organization of landscapes.  
The rise of a manufacturing economy implied a certain type of development that is 
most visible in the actions and efforts of individual manufactures. One such individual 
was Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, a gunpowder manufacturer and founder and proprietor of 
the E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company. This study engages the first two decades of the 
DuPont Company (1800-1820), and argues that manufacturers lobbied for productive 
economic growth and development during the early republic.7 The DuPont Company in 
particular believed manufactures supported independence and prosperity through 
domestic production and increased economic exchange. Their actions also contributed to 
economic expansion through the creation of new markets for their powder. Ultimately, 
the growth they advocated was physical as well. America’s emerging industrial economy 
was the outcome of productive activity by DuPont and other industrialists whose actions 
were “responsible for urban and regional development.”8 In constructing a working 
factory environment, DuPont effectually organized the social and economic lives of its 
workers and influenced the landscape around them.  
While there is a fairly rich literature dealing with the DuPont Company, the 
historiography remains dedicated to studies of the family’s life, corporate methods, 
working-class culture, and technological know-how.9 Rarely do studies engage the 
company’s wider economic position or regional influence in early America. This study 
 
7 In my discussion of the company, I have chosen to use the current spelling of “DuPont.” When referring 
to the family, however, the name will be written as “du Pont.” 
8 Michael Storper and Richard Walker, The Capitalist Imperative: Territory, Technology, and Industrial 
Growth (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989), 8. 
9 For general works on the DuPont Company’s history, see William H.A. Carr, The du Ponts of Delaware: 
A Fantastic Dynasty (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1964); William S. Dutton, Du Pont: 
Autobiography of a Scientific Enterprise (New York: Scribner, 1952); Adrian Kinnane, DuPont: From the 
Banks of the Brandywine to Miracles of Science (E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, 2002); Pap A. 
Ndiaye, Nylon and Bombs: DuPont and the March of Modern America, trans. Elborg Forster (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007). 
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analyzes the way early American culture guided and influenced DuPont’s growth and 
success. It also examines the company’s efforts to promote manufactures, create markets, 
and shape landscapes in local, regional, and national arenas. As in other parts of the 
world, the development of industrial capitalism, and the wider acceptance of domestic 
manufacturers and large-scale industry in the United States accelerated the emergence of 
factory towns, milling villages, and long-term urban growth.10 DuPont played an 
instrumental role in these developments and helped determine their specifically American 
characteristics.  
Accordingly, DuPont’s promotion and defense of manufactures and their necessity 
for national development is this thesis’ first chapter. The second chapter considers how 
the company created powder markets both through the acquisition of agents and 
participation in political and economic networks of exchange. The third chapter examines 
how regions and locations fuel innovation and how industry and high-technology 
businesses can then organize and shape built environments. Overall, the study analyzes 
the role of individual producers and highlights their participation in a culture that 
determined economic relations and shaped national development.   
 
 
10 Storper and Walker, The Capitalist Imperative, 6. 
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CHAPTER 1 
“OF THE FINEST QUALITY”: PROMOTING AND DEFENDING DOMESTIC 
MANUFACTURES IN EARLY NATIONAL AMERICA 
Capitalism, Culture, and Industrialists  
In the 1830s, while on his now famous tour through the United States, Alexis de 
Tocqueville reflected on what caused many Americans to follow industrial callings. 
Democracy, he argued, was the impetus for such a life calling. He believed that 
democracy, and its American manifestation in this case, led men to “prefer one kind of 
labor to another,” and specifically, “while it diverts them from agriculture, it encourages 
their taste for commerce and manufactures.”1 Without a traditional aristocracy or 
assurance of position, rich men in democracies were always searching for new sources of 
wealth. It is telling that in Tocqueville’s 1830s, they found this source in trade and 
manufactures. Fifty years earlier, America’s society and economy were predominately 
agricultural, with many of a republican mindset fearing the social decay and decline in 
virtue that inevitably accompanied large-scale manufactures.2 But in Tocqueville’s 
America, larger industrial enterprises were increasingly common, and such fears were 
scarce. In short succession, the country witnessed the arrival and proliferation of 
steamboats, trains, canals, and the electrical telegraph. As one historian has remarked, the 
early republic “was a crucial, if not the crucial, period in the development of that 
trademark characteristic of American society and economy, modern capitalism.”3 Yet, the 
 
1 Democracy in America, Vol. 2, ed. Phillips Bradley and trans. Henry Reeve (New York: Vintage Books, 
1990), 154. 
2 Drew McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980). 
3 Paul Gilje, “The Rise of Capitalism in the Early American Republic,” in Wages of Independence: 
Capitalism in the Early American Republic, ed. Paul Gilje (Madison: Madison House, 1997), 1. 
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emergence of a capitalist economy in early America, and specifically the rise of larger 
scale industrial capitalism, was not predetermined.4 Rather, following America’s 
independence from Great Britain, it was not entirely clear how, or in what form, the 
economy would proceed. These observations have led historians to analyze how and why 
industrialization emerged when it did, and its effects on the national economy.   
Recently, a number of historians have engaged these questions by viewing capitalist 
production and industrial growth as a cultural phenomenon. Though “capitalism” is a 
complex term, it usually refers to an economic system of relatively free exchange, private 
ownership of property and goods, a commoditization of the labor force, and is 
characterized by the investment of “capital” or resources in an enterprise with the 
expectation of receiving a gain in return. Additionally, this system stresses hard work and 
delayed gratification for individuals.5 For Joyce Appleby, capitalism as an economic 
system is contingent on time, place, laws, and customs. Beginning in England with the 
“convergence of agricultural improvements, global explorations, and scientific 
advances,” capitalism came into the world embedded in a culture’s expressions and 
actions.6 Appleby argues that changes in knowledge, technology, and behavior fostered 
economic expansion and gave rise to a new way of organizing markets. This emerging 
 
4 My use of the terms “industry,” “industrialism,” and “industrialization,” throughout this work requires 
some clarification. According to Raymond Williams’ helpful explanation of key social science and 
humanities terms, there are “two main senses” of industry: “the human quality of sustained action or effort; 
[and] an institution or set of institutions for production and trade.” My use conforms to the later definition, 
and more specifically with the word’s nineteenth century association to the application of technical 
inventions to organized production on a large-scale as distinct from both traditional agricultural production 
and small-scale craft and artisan manufactures. Raymond Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture 
and Society, Revised Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976, 1983), 165-168. 
5 This definition is largely drawn from: Joyce Appleby, The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2010), 6-7; and Paul Gilje, “The Rise of Capitalism in the Early 
American Republic,” in Wages of Independence, 7. Williams observes that “capitalist” began to refer to 
those who controlled the means of production. “Capitalism” can also designate an entire society, or the 
features of a society, where a capitalist economic system predominates. Williams, Keywords, 50-52. 
6 Appleby, The Relentless Revolution, 21. 
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capitalist system arose from the practiced cultural behaviors of a people who “acquired 
the power to bend political and social institutions to their demands.”7 They did this by 
privately investing in the economy, encouraging disciplined work and ingenuity of new 
technologies to enhance productivity, and ultimately by reorganizing the political and 
social systems to empower a moneyed aristocracy or bourgeoisie in Western Europe and 
the United States.   
Similarly, in his comparative analysis of industrialization in Britain and Germany, 
Richard Biernacki recognizes that practices and techniques are arranged by cultural 
definitions, with culture as a driver of actions. The vectors of influence run from culture 
to economic arrangement, rather than vice-versa. For example, in England, where a 
market economy developed before labor was commoditized, finished manufactured 
goods became the measure of a worker’s worth. Alternatively, in Germany, where the 
manufacturing of commodities such as wool developed prior to market demand, workers 
were compensated based on the time and labor they expended on the production process. 
For Biernacki, the commoditization of labor and the emergence of capitalism took shape 
differently according to the cultural assumptions of Englishmen and Germans. In each 
country, culture was a “positive shaper rather than an accompaniment or passive resource 
for institutions.”8 In Biernacki’s and Appleby’s analyses, culture is a definitive force of 
market production and exchange. 
How might an examination of cultures of capitalism help explain industrialization in 
the early American republic? For one, it suggests that, at least for England, capitalism 
and market relations preceded industrialization. It can be argued that this was the case in 
 
7 Appleby, The Relentless Revolution, 118. 
8 Richard Biernacki, The Fabrication of Labor: Germany and Britain, 1640-1914 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995), 475. 
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America as well, and that capitalist behavior and market organization defined the 
beginnings of industrial production. One way this can be observed is by taking into 
consideration historians’ assertions that individuals are the practicing embodiment of 
their culture. As Appleby argues in an earlier essay, European demand for American 
grains brought ordinary men into the Atlantic trade world, and enhanced the value of 
their harvests.9 By involving themselves in this productive economy; by choosing to 
invest in houses, property, public works, and cities; and by accumulating wealth through 
production and trade early Americans mimicked the capitalistic behaviors of their 
English counterparts. Once independent and free to express themselves, many 
Americans—both urban and rural—noticeably became involved in national and 
international production and commodity trade.10 This led to economic growth through the 
 
9 Joyce Appleby, “Commercial Farming and the ‘Agrarian Myth’ in the Early Republic,” The Journal of 
American History, 68, No. 4 (March, 1982): 833-849.  
10 American historians have offered several explanations for how and when capitalist production and 
expanded markets took root in America. While it is widely understood that agriculture and industry existed 
in America since the early days of colonization, the contention has been on when exactly and how it 
became capitalist, or investment and market oriented, in nature. As mentioned, historian Joyce Appleby is 
particularly concerned with the specific developments that allowed capitalism to take root. For her, a 
market revolution of sorts took place in England long before the early nineteenth century, and it occurred 
through individual participation and action. The English and Netherlands’ agricultural revolutions 
increased output, freed up labor, and opened the countryside to commercial relations. Before the American 
Revolution, Appleby, and a number of scholars have argued that the colonists were becoming more rather 
than less British. This ultimately excelled their desires for independence and greater participation in the 
world’s marketplaces. Following the Constitution’s ratification, Republican notions of liberty extended to 
the economy and stressed the idea that individuals could improve themselves through profitable exchange 
in a market society. See especially, Joyce Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican 
Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University Press, 1984). Historians Christopher Clark and 
Cathy Matson both see capitalism taking root during this time, and in similar ways. In his analysis of 
capitalism’s origins in rural Massachusetts, Clark notes that “people did not just respond to things, they 
made them happen.” In short time, Massachusetts’ rural west went from an economy dominated by 
independent farmers, to one participating in a national marketplace. See, Christopher Clark, The Roots of 
Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), 8. Matson 
also recognizes the release of economic energy following the nation’s political organization and 
stabilization of revenue. See, Cathy Matson, “Capitalizing Hope: Economic Thought and the Early 
National Economy,” in Wages of Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic, ed. Paul Gilje 
(Madison: Madison House, 1997). William Cronon, however, locates the origins of this economy in a far 
earlier period. If events after the Revolution finally spelled the triumph of capitalism, its habits and actions 
had a long history dating back to early English settlements in the New World. See, William Cronon, 
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exportation of raw materials and ultimately to investments in domestic manufactures that 
could process materials locally for sale in both domestic and international markets. All 
this is to highlight two points about the emergence of industrialization in early America. 
First, manufactures and industrialization came about primarily through cultural behaviors 
and actions of individuals participating in an expanding national and international 
economy.11 Second, those arguments for a market revolution that “created ourselves and 
most of the world we know” have been exaggerated.12 Instead, by analyzing the actions 
of individual producers and entrepreneurs to create and defend their products, expand 
markets, and shape their environments, it is clear that their cultural efforts, attitudes, and 
behaviors stimulated American industrialization. America created a “Market Revolution,” 
not the other way around.   
The origins and actions of one firm, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, a 
gunpowder manufacture just outside Wilmington, Delaware, and its proprietor Eleuthère 
Irénée du Pont, provide an excellent case study for understanding America’s industrial 
    
Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology of New England (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1983).   
11A number of historians have recently drawn attention to the important economic role of individuals in the 
early republic. Lawrence Peskin notes that while much has been said about the industrial revolution, little 
has been said about industrial revolutionaries. For him this suggests what has been a preoccupation with 
forces rather than humans when explaining economic change. Lawrence Peskin, Manufacturing 
Revolution: The Intellectual Origins of Early American Industry (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2003),1.  Jonathan Prude also suggests that “the coming of industrial order—and of factories—
happened because specific people acted for specific reasons.” Jonathan Prude, “Capitalism, 
Industrialization, and the Factory in Post-Revolutionary America,” in Wages of Independence, 91. Steven 
Watts is also concerned with the individual’s role in the economy, but he is also interested in process. In his 
analysis, the shift from republicanism to liberal capitalism came about due to the “cultural hegemony” of an 
influential socio-political group. He uses “cultural hegemony” to refer to “the way by which dominant class 
values, organization, and definitions of reality seem to attract ‘spontaneous’ loyalty rather than simply 
being imposed on society through brute force.” Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making 
of Liberal America, 1790-1820 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), Introduction. 
Though I partially agree with Watts, my use of culture here is less a part of elite society and “spontaneous 
loyalty,” and is instead expressed through the behaviors and actions of commoners and elites alike that, 
through their participation and decisions, drive economies in particular directions. 
12 Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 5. 
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beginnings. The DuPont story is useful for several reasons. First, the company’s location 
in a growing industrial region and innovative community made it a direct participant in 
the physical growth of industry and the encouragement of economic advancement. 
Second, by acquiring sales agents and successfully marketing powder to a number of 
states, the firm bolstered hopes that American industries could supply domestic 
consumption. Finally, the du Pont family’s actions and beliefs highlight the nation’s 
shifting political economy from one based heavily on agriculture and post-revolutionary 
free-trade to a post-War of 1812 embrace of large-scale manufactures and mercantilist 
protections.   
In 1800, E.I. du Pont, along with his father (French Physiocrat and economist Pierre 
Samuel du Pont de Nemours) brother, and their families, emigrated from France to 
America. The family’s motivation was to speculate on western lands and develop a 
profitable commercial carrying business between France and the West Indies.13 When 
shortly after settling in America their commercial enterprise DuPont de Nemours Father, 
Sons & Company failed, the family was forced to rely on what had originally been a 
supplemental plan: the manufacture of gunpowder. The family hoped that E.I. du Pont’s 
considerable skill in manufacturing powder, along with the government’s need for it, 
would provide a “positive certainty of great profits.”14 Shortly after initiating operations, 
these hopes were realized. Production, sales, and profits generally increased—with a few 
down periods—over the next several decades, as the company’s reputation, output, and 
physical footprint grew. Its proprietor, E.I. du Pont, however, faced a number of issues 
 
13 Mack Thompson, “Causes and Circumstances of the Du Pont Family’s Emigration,” French Historical 
Studies, 6, No. 1 (Spring, 1969), 67-77. 
14 Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours to Jacques Bidermann, New York, December 1, 1800, in Life of 
Eleuthère Irénée du Pont from Contemporary Correspondence, 1799-1802, Vol. 5, trans. B. G. du Pont 
(Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1924), 191-192. 
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and challenges while working to achieve these results. These included not only the 
hardships involved in transferring French techniques and processes to America, in 
manufacturing the powder itself, and in overcoming the general scarcity of wage labor 
due to the availability of inexpensive land, but also the struggle to protect trade secrets 
and ward off labor piracy while maintaining creative control over the company and 
building trust in its products. E.I. du Pont was a significant promoter of manufactures in 
the early republic, and his active participation in a community of manufactures, 
producers, and economists should not be ignored. Together his struggles and promotional 
endeavors highlight the individual industrialist’s role as a cultural actor striving to 
participate in and shape a growing market economy.  
One way to answer questions, such as those posed at the outset of this chapter, about 
the composition and direction of the United States’ early national economy is to look at 
individual actors within a culture. E.I. du Pont and other industrialists established 
manufacturing operations and helped influence perceptions of how those industries were 
received. In a society pursuing economic development and expressing an increasingly 
capitalistic mentality, small and large manufactures and agricultural producers alike 
expanded markets, equated industrial growth with national prosperity, and secured 
legislation that recognized the legitimacy of their businesses. While Tocqueville was 
astute in associating industrial growth and democracy, there is more to the story. 
Democracy did not alone stimulate manufacturers to increasingly expand production, 
technology, and markets; rather they expanded as part of a culture that rewarded 
individual efforts. Yet their lives were not merely culturally determined, it still took 
distinct political, religious, and economic realities to motivate their actions. The 
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eighteenth-century Atlantic world’s developing market culture compelled individuals to 
seek new identities, and participate in larger economic activity. In the United States, 
where democracy, nationalism, and conceptions of freedom helped stimulate this activity, 
it took individuals and businesses, like E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, behaving in 
specific ways to secure the growth of industry, its means of exchange, and the rules of 
economic participation.  
 
From Free Markets to Neo-Mercantilism: Economic Sentiments  
at the Turn of the Nineteenth Century 
When the du Pont family arrived in America at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century they entered a nation engaged in a dynamic debate about how to define and 
determine its economic future. Between the 1780s and 1820s, America transitioned from 
a nation espousing principles of free-trade and in search of international markets for its 
agricultural produce to one advancing commercial protections and emphasizing internal 
developments as well as national economic growth in the agricultural, commercial, and 
manufacturing sectors. In hindsight this transition seems dramatic, as much of the 
country’s population during this period continued to be employed in agriculture and live 
in rural communities. Additionally, many influential public thinkers and officials such as 
Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson spoke of the virtues of agriculture and rebuked 
the vices and moral decay associated with large manufactures.15  Yet, during the years in 
 
15 In 1760, Franklin imagined that Americans would for centuries find employment in agriculture, thereby 
helping to free them “effectually from [their] fears of American manufactures.” Franklin believed that 
manufactures promoted the growth of a landless poor who had to work for others at low wages. See 
Chapter One epigraph in David R. Meyer, The Roots of American Industrialization (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2003), 1. Several years later, Jefferson echoed this sentiment by referring to 
those who labor in the earth as “the chosen people of God.” Furthermore, manufactures and other 
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question, industrial pursuits and large-scale manufactures occupied an increasingly 
visible economic role. Especially along the eastern seaboard in the mid-Atlantic and 
Northeast, new industries emerged and began to employ a moderate percent of the 
nation’s population alongside a consistently growing agricultural sector.16 Proprietors and 
firms such as DuPont were instrumental in facilitating these economic changes. As one 
scholar asserts, ordinary people’s desire to consume motivated their industriousness and 
productivity and forged the “political, legal, and social milieu” that liberated 
entrepreneurial and commercial dynamism across the eastern United States.17 Throughout 
this transitional period, the nation’s emerging capitalist culture composed of productive 
individuals stimulated the economic changes that were taking place. To better understand 
DuPont’s role as a contributor to these changes, it is helpful to begin by depicting 
America’s early economic climate and analyzing the motivations for change that resulted 
in an expanding domestic economy.  
Following the Revolution, American foreign policy under the Articles of 
Confederation acted to open international markets and advance policies of commercial 
freedom. This initially took the form of discrimination against British mercantilist 
practices embodied in Thomas Jefferson’s efforts as a foreign minister to create a 
commercial treaty with France that counteracted Britain’s continued control of the market 
for many American raw materials. Since post-colonial America remained a 
predominantly agricultural nation producing an abundance of foodstuffs and valuable 
    
endeavors that required subservience to a business owner or boss would “suffocate the germ of virtue,” and 
restrict individual freedoms. For Jefferson’s sentiments, see McCoy, The Elusive Republic, 12.  
16 Between 1810 and 1840 the percentage of the American population employed by manufactures rose from 
3.2 percent to 8.7 percent. During the same period, the percentage of population employed by agriculture 
decreased slightly from 72.3 percent to 67.2 percent. Meyer, Roots of American Industrialization, 3.  
17 Meyer, Roots of American Industrialization, 10. 
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cash crops such as cotton, tobacco, and wheat, the maintenance of foreign trade and the 
creation of markets was critical for the economy’s success. France “held the key” to 
America’s commercial problem because it provided markets for American produce in 
exchange for French “manufactures, oils, wines, tropical produce, and other articles.”18 It 
was believed that the French trade offered a way for Americans to escape their 
commercial dependence on Britain by opening new avenues for exchange, despite the 
fact that it merely shifted dependence from one nation to another.19 Jefferson’s support 
for a Franco-American treaty achieved little more than advancing a mercantilist policy 
that ultimately failed when French nationalists also abandoned their own prospects of free 
trade following the onset of the French Revolution.  
In 1789, following the ratification of the Constitution, James Madison continued 
Jefferson’s policies from his position in the House of Representatives. Madison also 
pursued a policy of commercial discrimination against the British by supporting a 
universal tonnage duty on merchant vessels of countries with whom America had treaties 
and higher duties on those—namely the British—with whom they did not.20  This policy 
was eventually rejected by the Senate and ensured, for the time-being, that neither 
Jefferson nor Madison were successful in dismantling Britain’s supremacy over 
American trade.  
 
18 Merrill D. Peterson, “Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, Third Series, 22, No. 4 (Oct., 1965), 595. 
19 Without entirely acknowledging this shifting economic dependence, Jefferson seemed content with this 
strategy, as Peterson notes, because the advantages of direct trade with France were not only good from an 
economic standpoint, but from a moral and political one as well. For Jefferson, the plan offered a “means of 
curbing British power and of multiplying ties of interest and affection with the only nation that deserved, or 
was likely to justify, American friendship.” Peterson, “Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy,” 600.  
20 For Jefferson’s struggles in securing a Franco-American treaty see, Peterson, “Thomas Jefferson and 
Commercial Policy,” 603-604. And for a discussion of Madison’s desires to discriminate against British 
trade see, Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-
1800 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 88-89.  
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In his role as the Secretary of Treasury, Alexander Hamilton presented an opposing 
view to Madison’s and Jefferson’s that also looked to the international arena for a way to 
develop American commerce and secure economic independence. Unlike Madison and 
Jefferson, who were most concerned with the productive sectors of the American 
economy represented by individual landowners and agriculturalists, Hamilton believed 
that the merchant class performed the most creative role in the nation’s economy. He 
therefore set out to create a political economy that centered on the merchant class’ wide 
variety of “knowledge, experience, and ideas.”21 Hamilton imagined a dynamic and 
active central government that needed stable revenue to properly oversee national affairs. 
Under his system, revenue would come from a series of duties on imported goods. Since 
ninety-percent of America’s imports during this time came from Great Britain, any 
disruption of trade with that nation would destroy his entire system.22 The importance of 
maintaining amiable relations with Great Britain was essential to Hamilton’s plan and 
directly contradicted the policies presented by Jefferson and Madison. The two opposing 
sides represent the nation’s early political split over how to shape the national economy. 
Whereas Hamilton sought to maintain close commercial relations with Great Britain and 
model America’s fiscal policy on a system of funded debt to support the national 
government, Jefferson and Madison actively labored to break America’s economic 
dependence on Britain and establish alternative outlets for the country’s agricultural 
produce.   
 
21 Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, 116. 
22 Elkins and McKitrick, The Age of Federalism, 124. John Nelson provides a brief and cogent description 
of Hamilton’s political economy by suggesting that Hamilton sought to secure national stability and 
independence through a strong central government, the “central government through debt service, debt 
service through a particular fiscal program, the fiscal program through tariff revenues, [and] tariff revenues 
through trade with Great Britain.” John R. Nelson, Jr., Liberty and Property: Political Economy and 
Policymaking in the New Nation, 1789-1812 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 32. 
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The Madisonian and Jeffersonian political economy ostensibly gave most support to 
the domestic production of goods as well as individual farmers and proprietors. While 
Jefferson and Madison’s early commercial policies may have failed, the spirit and 
motivation behind them gripped the nation following the pivotal election of 1800. The 
divisions formed in the earlier opposition between the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian 
political and economic camps came to the foreground in this election with each group 
believing that “victory for their side was essential to the nation’s survival.”23 The election 
of Thomas Jefferson to the presidency cemented the presence of a new economic culture 
in the nation’s highest offices. Jefferson’s earlier search for “a national system of political 
economy capable of advancing the interests of the American republic,” was now in a 
position to energize the nation’s economy.24 Over the next thirty or so years, America’s 
political culture highlighted the national economic importance of yeoman farmers, 
laborers, and a multitude of independent producers. The advancement of Jefferson’s 
productive, agrarian, and market based system over Hamilton’s financial and merchant-
led commercial one also acknowledged the rising fortunes of a particular type of 
capitalist economy that valued producers ahead of financial middlemen and those 
providing transportation services.25  
Yet, even the triumph of the Jeffersonian system does not alone explain how or why 
 
23 Sean Wilentz, The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2005), 90. 
24 Peterson, “Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy,” 609. 
25 Jefferson’s political economy and the type of capitalism he supported in America drew heavily from 
contemporary European ideas about the productiveness of agriculture. David McNally confirms this by 
arguing that classical political economy represented a social and economic theory of agrarian capitalism. 
Furthermore, he asserts that pre-Ricardian economists in Europe displayed a bias in favor of the agrarian, 
not the commercial or industrial classes. David McNally, Political Economy and the Rise of Capitalism: A 
Reinterpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), xii-xiv. In contrast, Hamilton supported 
this later system by suggesting that merchants and banks should control the nation’s wealth. Again, Joyce 
Appleby has explained the Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian debate—the conflict between the Republicans and 
Federalists—as a struggle between “two different elaborations of capitalistic development in America.” 
Appleby, “Commercial Farming,” 836.  
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Americans began to support domestic manufactures and large scale industries. But, as 
historians have recently argued, the acknowledged economic importance of individual 
producers and the growth of commercial agriculture were important prerequisites for the 
advancement of American manufactures.26 In addition to this, a number of policies 
passed during Jefferson’s administration, and those of his successors, as well as the 
actions of individuals and the advocacy societies they formed generated support for 
industrial production and resulted in what can best be described as a neo-mercantilistic 
political economy.27 The Embargo of 1807 and the subsequent Non-Intercourse Acts 
were implemented with the hope that foreign nations would entreat fairly with American 
when they realized the importance of its trade. Instead, these policies merely helped 
propel the country into war with Britain. In time, the United States’ failure to secure 
favorable trading rights with Britain and other nations led a popular desire to focus 
instead on internal economic development and growth.   
In 1815, President James Madison called for the creation of a new national bank, a 
tariff to protect American manufactures, and support for improvements in transportation 
infrastructure such as roads and canals. Congress agreed to all of these measures. Even 
 
26 Appleby notes that Jefferson’s economic policies were not specifically anti-commercial, but entailed a 
“commitment to growth through the unimpeded exertions of individuals whose access to economic 
opportunity was both protected and facilitated by government.” Appleby, “Commercial Farming,” 849. In 
other words, Jefferson believed that individual producers were the heart of the economy and that 
government action and policies could facilitate their access to domestic and international marketplaces for 
their goods. Furthermore, in his account of the early republic, David Meyer suggests commercial 
agriculture helped enable the rise of manufactures. He argues that the agricultural and industrial 
transformations occurring across the American landscape reinforced one another. Specifically, in the 
Pennsylvania area, he concludes that the region’s prosperous agriculture looked to other regions of the 
country for markets and by doing so provided a model for emerging manufactures. Meyer, The Roots of 
American Industrialization, 4-6. 
27 Lawrence Peskin refers to America’s early nineteenth century economy as neomercantilistic, but is 
careful to point out that it differed in key ways from the classical mercantilist doctrine. Most importantly, 
he argues, it differed because Americans did not view international trade as the bedrock of the economy, 
and instead they entertained “the possibility of a more self-sustained national market.” Lawrence Peskin, 
Manufacturing Revolution: The Intellectual Origins of Early American Industry (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2004), 6. 
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Jefferson and Madison agreed that an export economy left America dependent on a 
Europe that could not be relied upon. Ultimately, Jefferson’s Republican Party shifted 
their support from the exportation of productive agriculture to encourage national 
prosperity through subsidies to commerce, manufactures, and internal improvements.28 
These ambitions culminated in Henry Clay’s “American System” that successfully 
increased the tariff in 1824, and generally proposed “a national transportation network 
that would make the United States economically independent of Europe and 
geographically interdependent within itself.”29 All these prospects ensured that America’s 
economic development had adopted a decisively nationalist agenda that not only 
promoted agricultural production, but also ensured legal and financial protections for 
nascent manufactures and commercial industries. By adding these protections, America 
in the 1820s began to resemble a conglomeration of both Hamilton’s strong central 
government with revenue collecting abilities, and the productive spirit of Jefferson’s 
individualist market participants. Additionally, Clay’s system helped usher in a collection 
of economic policies that were essentially neo-mercantilist, using tariffs to promote 
production and exports and discourage imports. Not everyone, however, favored the 
government’s active role in the economy. Senator and Vice-President John Calhoun, 
though also favoring economic growth, believed that independent producers should be 
free to find markets without the assistance or hindrance of the federal government.30 Yet, 
despite protests by Calhoun and others largely located in the South, the protective 
policies of the early 1820s emerged as a strong political option during a contentious age 
 
28 Paul E. Johnson, The Early American Republic, 1789-1829 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 
138. 
29 Johnson, The Early American Republic, 140.
30 Lacy K. Ford, “Republican Ideology in a Slave Society: The Political Economy of John C. Calhoun,” 
The Journal of Southern History 54, no. 3 (Aug., 1988), 422. 
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of American development that highlighted the state’s role in directing the economy. 
 
The Economic State: Physiocracy and Du Pont’s French Background  
The du Ponts arrived in America fairly early on in the progression of these economic 
debates. Despite coming from another country and society, the family had for some time 
participated in similar economic discussions in France. Additionally, much as the United 
States came to rely on an increasingly powerful central government to ensure economic 
growth and protection, the du Pont’s hailed from a French society where they lobbied for 
a strong government that would support and direct economic activity. Beginning in the 
sixteenth century, states became central economic actors in the European economy, and 
while in France, the du Ponts—especially the patriarch Pierre Samuel du Pont de 
Nemours—participated extensively in political and economic discussion and policy 
formation at the national level.31 As a follower of the Physiocratic school, P. S. du Pont 
helped erect and disseminate a complex science of wealth that constituted the first 
modern school of economics.32 Physiocracy meant the rule of nature, and the conviction 
that agriculture was the only source of national wealth resulted in support for policies that 
removed restrictions on the sale of grain and an overall freeing of trade. Generally, 
Physiocracy’s defense of economic individualism, absolute land ownership, legal 
uniformity, and a national market where human labor could be bought and sold 
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31 Historian Immanuel Wallerstein expounds the view that “the development of strong states in core areas 
of the European world was an essential component of the development of modern capitalism.” This 
observation mirrors a conviction held by the Physiocrats in France and later preached by the du Ponts and 
other advocates for a self-sufficient economy in the United States. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern 
World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth 
Century (San Diego: Academic Press, Inc., 1974), 134. 
32 The school’s founder François Quesnay developed his theories based on the actual situations of the 
French economy during the mid-to-late eighteenth century. See Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, The Origins of 
Physiocracy: Economic Revolution and Social Order in Eighteen-Century France (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1976). 
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demonstrated early support for a capitalist economy.33  
Despite an emphasis on the radical liberalization of the French economy, the 
Physiocrats were a conservative body that supported the monarchy and state power. They 
believed that individual economic activity would have a positive consequence at the 
macro-economic level—the collective interest was the sum of individual interests.34 In 
total, through the promotion of free trade and the modernization of agriculture they hoped 
to restore the French kingdom’s legitimate political authority. Thomas Jefferson and 
other Americans championed their methods and envisioned them as a potential avenue 
for the new nation’s political economy. The intended results of the Physiocrats’ measures 
offered a new direction for the United States; an economy that would support national 
strength and development, but also needed federal and state government support for its 
promotion. In essence, this philosophy advocated agricultural and productive growth, but 
to achieve it, the government’s strength and support was necessary. This was the 
philosophy the du Pont’s carried with them to the United States in 1800, and it was 
already present in many respects in the new social order supported by the Jeffersonian 
Republicans. 
 E.I. du Pont’s own background in France convinced him of the importance of 
productive industry and its need for government support. His experience also positioned 
him for manufacturing success in America. Before the French Revolution, E.I du Pont 
learned the skills and techniques of powder making at the state-run gunpowder mills at 
Essonne outside of Paris. He trained under the famed French chemist Antoine Lavoisier 
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33 Fox-Genovese, The Origins of Physiocracy, 28. 
34 Yves Charbit, “The Political Failure of an Economic Theory: Physiocracy,” Population, Vol. 57 (June, 
2002), 877. 
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who had engineered new techniques to improve the quality of powder.35 It was these 
techniques that Irénée took with him to the United States a decade later. But even more 
important is the relationship between industrial production and the state that he observed 
while a student at Essonne. Because he matured in a society where the government 
involved itself heavily in the administration and development of scientific industries, du 
Pont was never entirely able to diminish the necessity of this relationship. Furthermore, 
the Physiocratic principles espoused by his father stressed this relationship as well. Only 
a strong central government could protect an individual’s right to produce and freely 
participate in economic exchange. In the United States, E.I. du Pont continued to exercise 
these ideals as he actively sought government approval for his powder manufactory, 
labored to obtain government business, and petitioned for policies to support industry. 
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35 For a description of E.I. du Pont’s career in France, see Carr, The du Ponts of Delaware. Another good 
depiction can be found in, Gavin Weightman, The Industrial Revolutionaries: The Making of The Modern 
World, 1776-1914 (New York: Grove Press, 2007), 80-89.  Additionally, Darwin Stapleton argues that du 
Pont’s training at Essonne was important for his later success in America for a number of reasons. First, he 
speculates that the quality control E.I. du Pont studied in France was unknown in America. Furthermore, 
Irénée did not only receive training in France, but later returned for advice, equipment, and plans from the 
institution that succeeded Essonne after the French Revolution.  
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Figure 1: Portrait of E.I. du Pont (standing) studying with Antoine Lavoisier (sitting). 
This depiction would have the viewer believe that du Pont trained intimately with 
Lavoisier, but Darwin Stapleton suggests that this was probably not the case. The powder 
works at Essonne were large and catered to a number of students. It is also relevant that 
much of du Pont’s training was to prepare him as a powder administrator and not as a 
powder worker per se. See Darwin Stapleton, “Élève des Poudres,” 231. Source: E. I. du 
Pont & Lavoisier, painting by Wright, Portrait File, PF_20090605_201.tif, Hagley 
Museum and Library.   
 
Industrial Boosters and National Prosperity 
Within a few short years of the Constitution’s ratification, praise for manufactures 
and innovative, labor-saving machinery appeared in various areas of the country. “It must 
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afford great pleasure to the friends of American manufactures,” one newspaper read, “to 
see the rapid improvements which have, within these few years, been made in machinery 
within the United States.”36 Praising individuals who defied the odds against mechanical 
inventions, this description of Oliver Evans’ new carding machine is an early example of 
the growing enthusiasm for manufactures particularly in the mid-Atlantic and Northeast. 
This news report further asserted that Evans’ machine, when in use, enabled individual 
proprietors to “excel Europe in the manufactory of cards.”37 Indeed, this was important 
news to the friends of domestic manufactures who hoped machines like Evans’ would 
fuel the new American economy. That the country could best European manufactures 
appealed to post-revolutionary hopes and desires for independence, opportunity, and 
freedom. As one historian observes, “social equality and personal autonomy had an 
economic dimension” in the early republic, and because of this, “Americans seemed 
determined to avoid pecuniary dependence on others.”38 Though the desire for economic 
independence was a growing sentiment for many, domestic manufactures and other 
industries still had to be made safe and viable for those wishing to invest in or establish 
new enterprises. In the republic’s nascent years this became the task of individual 
industrialists, economic boosters, and supporters of manufactures. 
Historians have recently equated the emergence of domestic manufactures with the 
nation’s early political economy and republican identity. For one historian, nationalism 
was a strong motivator for economic growth. Specifically, the American Revolution and 
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36 “From the Delaware Gazette, of the 17th Inst.,” National Gazette, Vol. 1, Issue 42 (Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania), Early American Newspaper Series 1-3, 1690-1922, 166. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Watts, The Republic Reborn, 5. For more on economic independence in the early republic see: Merrill D. 
Peterson, “Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-1793,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third 
Series, 22, No. 4 (Oct., 1965): 584-610.  More telling of the sentiments that ultimately gripped the nation 
and stimulated economic growth is: Appleby, Capitalism and a New Social Order, especially Chapters 2-4. 
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subsequent independence “opened up new vistas that ultimately accelerated and reshaped 
developments underway.”39 These new projects were perhaps assisted, another historian 
argues, by policies and market relations. Protective policies, like increased tariffs and 
Jefferson’s 1807 Embargo, ostensibly offered assistance to domestic manufactures. In the 
1810s and after, it was hoped that the American System and other measures would 
develop the economy through government spending on public works, manufacturing 
technology and consumer incentives.40 Lawrence Peskin’s Manufacturing Revolution 
most thoroughly analyzes how a number of these factors fostered industrialization in the 
early republic. Manufacturing promoters stressed the harmony of manufactures with 
commerce and agriculture, therefore making them seem a natural and unthreatening 
addition to the economic sector. Most importantly, however, Peskin’s argument lends 
credence to arguments which emphasize the importance of the cultural backgrounds 
stimulating both the economy and manufactures in particular. The key to the market and 
industrial revolutions, and the enthusiasm for economic growth, was less the new 
technologies and transportations that expanded market transactions, but rather “a series of 
decisions made by individuals yearning to become part of the larger markets as 
consumers and producers.”41 The desires and actions of individual producers and 
consumers were ultimately responsible for demonstrating the necessity of manufactures 
and making them an essential part of the early American economy. 
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39 Gilje, “The Rise of Capitalism,” 7. 
40 Matson, “Capitalizing Hope,” 127. Matson also draws attention to an important caveat. Besides areas of 
the Northeast and mid-Atlantic, a substantial portion of Americans, set back from waterways, continued to 
produce largely for local exchange and household use. Development in the early republic, therefore, 
remained uneven. In another policy discussion, Economist C. Knick Harley, stretching his analysis to the 
1850s, is strongly convinced that tariffs stimulated American industrialization, and that manufactures 
depended on protection. See, C Knick Harley, “The Antebellum American Tariff: Food Exports and 
Manufacturing,” Explorations in Economic History 29, (1992): 375-400.  
41 Peskin, Manufacturing Revolution, 3. 
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As previously noted, E.I. du Pont was one individual who did much to promote 
manufactures and stress their importance for an independent economy and for national 
development. Early in his company’s tenure, he often did this through correspondence 
with family members and influential figures and through the promotion of his own 
products. Later, he toiled to defend individual rights to innovation, and vigilantly 
opposed labor piracy and industrial espionage—which he believed harmed honest and 
skilled manufacturers. In his writings and actions, he constantly linked the success of 
quality manufactures, like his own, to national development and the public good. Though 
from France, and not the United States, du Pont shared the country’s distaste for 
England—and its economic dominance—and, furthermore he adapted quickly to 
America’s productive mindset. He became committed to the importance of capital in the 
establishment of manufactures and in its use for national development and the public 
good. Though an immigrant, he was an essential part of America’s industrial 
development. Upon settling in the country, he seemed entirely in tune with the words of 
his father who wrote, “A great capital is needed to accomplish all the good that can be 
done—to reach every family and make it profitable to itself and helpful to others.”42 By 
earning a great capital, he, and other producers like him, could aid American 
development while advancing independence and the public good in the new nation. 
Once the DuPont Company erected its mills and began delivering powder, E.I. du 
Pont advertised his manufacture and its product as an essential contributor to economic 
development. Commodities are never simply material entities; they must be assigned a 
cultural value based on relative scarcity and desirability. The demand for most 
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42 Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours to Dr. Du Pont at Rotterdam, New York, August 4, 1800, in Life of 
Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. V, 148-149. 
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commodities can therefore be manipulated by consumer perceptions and advertising. 
Because of this, du Pont’s promotional language reveals how he turned his gunpowder 
into a sought after commodity. He did so by depicting domestic manufactures, like his 
own, as useful industries important to the nation’s identity. He sought to capitalize on 
sentiments of national strength and pride by suggesting that domestic products were not 
only better, but they helped reinforce economic stability and material independence as 
well. A company advertisement in New York State championed DuPont powder as 
superior “in point of strength, quickness, and cleanness” to the best imported powders. It 
then linked the quality of home manufactures to national identity in suggesting that “to 
every true American it must be a satisfactory prospect to see some of the home 
manufactures already superior to those of the old world.”43 Another advertisement, this 
one composed by a company agent in Philadelphia, Archibald McCall, also noted the 
powder’s domestic origins and compared it favorably to European brands.44 The 
company, and E.I. du Pont in his private correspondence, continued to use this type of 
laudatory language when promoting its powder and manufactures in general. 
Aside from his own manufacture, E.I. du Pont wrote increasingly about the 
significance of manufacturing for national strength and prosperity. In an 1808 letter, du 
Pont encouraged prominent Philadelphian James Mease’s idea to publish a periodical on 
agriculture, art, and manufacturing. The work would be highly useful, du Pont asserted, 
being “fully convinced that the country is more ripe for manufacturing than people 
generally think.”45 In his mind, a work like Mease’s would further encourage industry. 
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43 Victor du Pont, “Riflemen, Attention! Gunpowder of the First Quality,” New York, November 1, 1806 
44 “Gunpowder,” Aurora General Advertiser, January 31, 1805, Issue 4395 (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania), 4. 
45 E.I. du Pont to James Mease, Eleutherian Mills, January 21, 1808, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, 
Vol. VIII, 17. This letter arrived several years in advance of Mease’s ultimate publication of The Picture of 
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Also, between 1808 and 1810, du Pont endeavored to bolster the number of merino 
sheep—a famous Spanish breed—in America and use their wool to start a cloth 
manufactory run by his brother Victor. The merino’s fine wool, du Pont reasoned, would 
not only give his own company a great advantage but would also benefit the entire 
country. Cloth manufactures could compete directly with the English trade, potentially 
damage their commerce, and strengthen America’s economic independence.46  It was 
again on the subject of merino sheep, and specifically a desire to secure their passage to 
the United States, that du Pont wrote to departing president Thomas Jefferson about the 
country’s growing interest in manufactures. “The establishment of manufactures upon 
which every eye almost seems to be turned in the present moment,” du Pont wrote, was 
“a matter of the first magnitude for the prosperity and independence of [America].”47 
Once more wealth and prosperity were evoked. For du Pont and some others writing at 
the time, manufactures were an absolutely essential part of the growing nation’s 
economy, freedom, and longevity. 
E.I. du Pont’s efforts to promote manufactures and connect them to national 
prosperity, independence, and development offer an example of how individuals acted to 
establish industries and ensure their growth. Others joined du Pont in equating 
manufactures with national prosperity. An 1810 column in the Weekly Aurora, borrowing 
from news venues around the country, observed that “It is becoming an axiom with our 
wisest politicians, that the expansion of American manufactures is essential to our 
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Philadelphia: Giving an Account of Its Origin, Increase and Improvements in Arts, Sciences, 
Manufactures, Commerce and Revenue (Philadelphia: D. and T. Kite, 1811). 
46 E.I. du Pont to P.S. du Pont de Nemours, Eleutherian Mills, October 1, 1808, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée 
du Pont, Vol. VIII, 99-102; and E.I. du Pont to P.S. du Pont de Nemours, January 28, 1809, in Life of 
Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. VIII, 145. 
47 E.I. du Pont to President Jefferson, February 11, 1809, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. VIII, 
148-150. 
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national independence.”48 Swept by the same “merino mania” that motivated du Pont, 
agriculturalists and manufactures were both included in this prosperous vision. Wool was 
perhaps a perfect item to rally around as it offered potential benefits to multiple economic 
sectors.  In Boston, the arrival of merino sheep gave both farmers and industrialists “an 
opportunity which may never again occur.”49 Overall, it was not just manufactures but an 
industrious spirit and “producer critique” in the words of Lawrence Peskin that pushed du 
Pont and others to advocate support for manufactures and tie their growth to national 
prosperity.50 As du Pont firmly explained, “Every day’s work of adding the value of 
industry to the cost of raw material creates a new value incomparably surer than the 
profits of commerce.”51 These arguments, equating industry with national prosperity, 
were used to both justify economic growth and, if their language is taken at face value, to 
drive further innovation and compel other producers to participate in a burgeoning field 
of exchange. 
 
Piracy and Legitimacy 
As an actual manufacture busy fashioning commodities from raw materials, the 
DuPont Company faced a number of challenges that help illuminate the difficulty of 
establishing industries in the early United States. Manufacturers in antebellum America 
faced a number of specific issues concerning the promotion of their products and defense 
of their nascent industries. As national marketplaces rapidly emerged and the spread of 
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48 “From the Albany Register: Merino Wool,” Weekly Aurora, June 26, 1801, Issue 2 (Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania), Early American Newspapers Series 1-3, 1690-1922, 15. 
49 “From the Boston Chronicle,” Weekly Aurora, Issue 2, 15. 
50 Lawrence Peskin, “How the Republicans Learned to Love Manufacturing: The First Parties and the ‘New 
Economy,’” Journal of the Early Republic, 22, No. 2 (Summer, 2002), 262. 
51 E.I. du Pont to P.S. du Pont de Nemours, June 10, 1807, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. VII, 
306-307. 
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news and knowledge increased, producers entered emerging marketplaces where they 
faced a variety of competition.  
Ironically, as “free” exchange and forms of transparency became staples for markets, 
so too did industrial protection, secrecy, and violent competition. Though patents and 
copyright systems were in place thanks to the Constitution’s intellectual property 
clause—Article One, Section Eight—manufactures and inventors still responded in new 
ways to ward off espionage and piracy. E.I. du Pont specifically faced challenges to his 
creative control and intellectual property from both outside and within his company. In a 
time when the Embargo of 1807 and the War of 1812 stimulated inventive activity due to 
a paucity of raw materials and supplies from abroad, and in the period of economic 
contraction that followed the war’s end, E.I. du Pont and other manufactures had to ward 
off threats and challenges to their businesses and ensure that manufactures remained a 
viable and important part of the new economy.52 
Since skilled workers were scarce and labor generally expensive in the new nation, 
finding dedicated and trustworthy workers was an important step for new manufactures. 
One of the first tasks E.I. du Pont set himself to, after choosing a site for his manufacture, 
was finding skilled employees. Initially, he wrote to acquaintances in France hoping they 
might send him some workmen. French workers would be valuable to him as they were 
culturally familiar and would provide stability—as opposed to American workers who 
developed a sense of independence resulting from the high price of labor.53 This seems to 
belie du Pont’s commitment to national development, and in a way it does. His 
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52 B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff, “History Lessons: The Early Development of Intellectual 
Property Institutions in the United States,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15, No. 3 (Summer, 
2001), 239. 
53 E.I. du Pont to Mr. Robin, Comissioner of Powders at Essone, New York, January 25, 1802, in Life of 
Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. V, 360. 
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uneasiness as a new immigrant during his first few years in America often made him 
wary of those around him while simultaneously hoping to contribute to their national 
well-being, and thereby asserting his place as a citizen. Yet, even after acquiring a head 
workman from France, du Pont was reluctant to trust a fellow countryman. This piece of 
evidence favors the notion that du Pont was more worried about his own well-being than 
the country’s in general. To argue the reverse, however, du Pont’s fear of saboteurs in the 
workplace and employee betrayal attests to the unique skills and abilities he believed he 
offered the country. This ambiguity can be observed in his later efforts to import foreign 
laborers—rather than employing Americans—and yet offer them housing, accident 
insurance, and a healthy environment for their families. 
 One example in particular speaks to du Pont’s strong desire to safeguard his talents 
and knowledge. Before arriving at the Eleutherian Mills, Charles F. Parent, a French 
powder worker who agreed to venture to America and work for the DuPont Company, 
was made to sign an agreement with his new employers. This agreement ensured that 
once Parent’s contract with the company expired, he could not “work in America either 
personally or by giving information to any other powder manufactory.”54 But, early in his 
tenure Parent’s behavior increasingly worried du Pont. Parent was miserable in America, 
and generally seemed disinterested in the company. To avoid the possibility that he might 
share valuable information with others out of frustration with his employers, E.I. du Pont 
had Parent briefly jailed before providing him with the capital to open his own mills in 
New Orleans where he would be far enough away from the company to no longer pose a 
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54 “Agreement with Parent,” in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. VI, 185-186.  
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threat.55 Du Pont’s handling of the Parent situation underscores the apprehension that his 
ideas and methods might be utilized by others. This fear was magnified because du Pont 
believed himself a unique producer in America. His anxiety is, therefore, ultimately 
interesting because, whereas many of his ideas, methods, and equipment came from 
France, it was the quintessential threat that Parent, another Frenchman, might compete 
with him in the marketplace. To avoid this, du Pont essentially shut Parent up, before 
neutralizing his threat and shipping him away entirely.  
Another example, highlighting the threat of labor piracy and du Pont’s efforts to 
combat it, occurred in early 1809. In this case, a man named Charles Munns who 
represented a group in Richmond, Virginia that hoped to open a rival powder mill opened 
communications with several du Pont workmen at a neighboring inn and attempted to 
lure them away from the company. Since workers held “special knowledge” of company 
procedures and equipment, they posed a considerable threat to the company if they were 
won over by others.56 When Munns was discovered, he fled to Philadelphia where E.I. du 
Pont caught up with him, gave him a “thrashing,” and had him thrown into jail. In a letter 
to his father, du Pont expressed that this affair was a very good one, because now, “no 
one [would] come for a long time to meddle with [their] affairs or to make trouble in 
[their] mills.”57 Several years after this occurred, Munns sued du Pont for abuse. In a 
decision labeled “Important to Manufactures,” the jury found du Pont not guilty, and 
believed he had probable cause in his accusations against Munns, as well as in his 
treatment toward him. (In a prior verdict, du Pont had been fined fifteen dollars for the 
 
55 William H.A. Carr, The du Ponts of Delaware: A Fantastic Dynasty (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1964), 73-74. 
56 George H. Gibson, “Labor Piracy on the Brandywine,” Labor History, 8, No. 2 (Spring, 1967), 176. 
57 E.I. du Pont to P.S. du Pont de Nemours, January 22, 1809, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. 
VIII, 134-135. 
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assault against Munns).58 What is important here is that once again du Pont’s behavior in 
maintaining secrecy and keeping strangers outside of his mills was ruled justifiable.  
A separate situation, occurring only slightly after the Munns case, saw a different 
individual attempt to infiltrate the DuPont Company mills. In this instance, a Dr. Thomas 
Ewell, who desired to open a gunpowder mill near Washington, reached out to E.I. du 
Pont to join him in the endeavor. Though the exchange began cordially, Ewell grew 
frustrated when du Pont declined joining him and refused to assist him by not providing 
skilled laborers and production methods. Ewell’s subsequent threats prompted du Pont to 
publish a pamphlet titled “Villany Detected” that chronicled their exchange. Du Pont 
called the credentials of Ewell into question and projected himself as the legitimate 
producer. Ewell’s attempts to seduce DuPont workers with extremely high wages and to 
record company machinery in operation further upset du Pont. Ewell was nothing but a 
charlatan, he charged, or “another eccentric adventurer,” who “thought he might at once 
become a great manufacturer.”59  
But Ewell’s actions and those by others who engaged in labor piracy and industrial 
espionage posed serious risks to honest producers according to du Pont, and he set out to 
justify himself to the public. He explained that the knowledge and skill gained by the 
company over time was private property on which the company’s survival depended.60 
That Ewell’s enterprise did not succeed suggests perhaps that du Pont’s pamphlet was 
effective, or at the very least that he was correct in his assessment of Ewell’s acumen and 
 
58 “Law Decision, Important to Manufactures,” Archives of Useful Knowledge, a Work Devoted to 
Commerce, Manufactures, Rural…, July 1, 1811, 2, No. 1, American Periodicals Series Online (Accessed: 
Nov. 15, 2009), 66-75. 
59 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, Wilmington, Delaware, “Villany Detected” (Wilmington: Wilson, 
1812), 1. 
60 E.I.DP&C., “Villany Detected,” 9.  
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that the man possessed little or none of the skills du Pont believed his firm offered. 
Furthermore, just slightly before this encounter, the state of Delaware passed a law firmly 
supporting du Pont’s arguments. In 1811, the state legislature passed a law to encourage 
the establishment of manufactures within the state. Section Four of the law specifically 
addresses the problems du Pont faced by instituting a fine on anyone that “shall contract 
with, entice, or persuade or endeavor to seduce or encourage any artificer or workman.”61 
A victory for du Pont, he believed this law legitimized his production and criminalized 
those who threatened the security and survival of what he recognized as his efforts to 
maintain an “honest” manufacture.62  
The main point here is that manufactures were often new and fragile endeavors that 
needed the efforts of individuals, and appeals to the larger community, to persevere 
through the early republic’s changing economic climate. When in 1804 E.I. du Pont 
applied to the Secretary of State for a fourteen-year patent on his new graining machine 
that “proved a perfect success,” he did so as the market for his business was starting to 
grow.63 For du Pont, receiving this patent was an “ample reward for the pains that [he 
had] taken,” to obtain a strong reputation for his powder.64 Similarly, as others hoped to 
duplicate his success, he had to fight off competitors and “pirates” that sought to steal 
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61 Delaware Senate and House of Representatives, “An Act to Encourage the Establishment of Certain 
Manufactories Within this State,” Laws of the State of Delaware, Vol. IV (Wilmington: M. Bradford & R. 
Porter, 1816), 399-400. 
62 Of course it was easy for du Pont to feel that his own manufacture was the truly legitimate producer 
because no observable competitor shared his foreign-sourced knowledge. Du Pont’s techniques were 
wholly “honest” or without theft only in his own mind, because much of his equipment and information 
was borrowed from those who freely shared it in France, rather than safeguarding it from use by others. He 
did, however, make improvements in many techniques and machinery once in America, and it is perhaps 
these improvements and his own labors to establish a new business that he felt to be the honest efforts that 
others, who wanted him to readily handover his ideas, were trying to steal and therefore needed 
institutional protections.  
63 B. Zorina Khan and Kenneth L. Sokoloff make the connection between access to markets and patent 
activity in: Zorina Khan and Sokoloff, “History Lessons,” 240. 
64 E.I. du Pont to the Secretary of State, undated, probably in late 1804, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, 
Vol. VII, 31-35. 
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ideas, machinery, and his employees. That his actions, according to one author, helped 
secure the Delaware legislature’s passage of the 1811 law encouraging manufactures can 
be understood as a success for a certain type of production.65 This law, and others 
including extended patents, copyrights, and trademarks, ensured that “honest” producers 
or legitimized industries would receive protection going forward and that pirating labor 
and stealing secrets was equitable to the theft or appropriation of one’s private property. 
Du Pont’s actions were vindicated by the Munns case and through the Delaware 
legislature’s new law. They also helped ensure, that at least for the time being, certain 
forms of industrial protection and security were necessary for the development of new 
manufactures, and that their survival required that government policy and action secure 
for them the room to grow and succeed.  
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65 Gibson, “Labor Piracy,” 179. 
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CHAPTER 2 
DUPONT AND AMERICA’S EARLY ECONOMIC FRONTIER 
“Too Big to Fail?” 
In November of 2008, General Motors’ chairman Rick Wagoner made a public plea 
for federal funding to save the sinking company. Saddled with plummeting shares and the 
impending reality of bankruptcy, Wagoner stressed the urgency of immediate assistance. 
At stake was the livelihood of subsidiary industries, communities, and thousands of 
workers who depended on the company for survival.1 This plight was not General 
Motors’ alone however, as several prominent financial institutions appealed for federal 
dollars in the closing months of 2008 and early 2009. During that period, nine large 
banks, including Bank of America and Citigroup, automakers, and federal lending 
programs became the targeted recipients of seven billion dollars in federal bailout 
money.2 The pretense that these institutions and industries were “too big to fail” 
putatively justified the awarding of this substantial financial package. The sum’s 
subsequent dispersal among its numerous beneficiaries generated debate over which 
groups were deserving of this money, prompting one journalist to ask “What does it 
actually mean for an institution to be ‘too big to fail?’”3 
Nearly two centuries earlier, a group of Delaware industrialists gathered together to 
also appeal for a type of federal aid. Calling themselves the Society of the State of 
Delaware for the Promotion of American Manufactures, they petitioned Congress to 
support their fledgling enterprises. American manufacturing establishments were rapidly 
 
1 Bill Vlasic, “G.M., Once a Powerhouse, Pleads for Bailout,” The New York Times, 12 November 2008, 
B1. 
2 Edmund L. Andrews and Stephen Labaton, “Bailout Plan: $2.5 Trillion and a Strong U.S. Hand,” The 
New York Times, 11 February 2009, A1. 
3 Catherine Rampell, “Defining ‘Too Big to Fail,’” The New York Times, 20 August 2009.  
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declining they argued, and foreign manufacturers were threatening to overstock markets 
and crush domestic competition.4 Like General Motors’ Wagoner, they equated their 
welfare with the country’s at large. Their prosperity funded public and private 
improvements, employed idle hands, and encouraged the immigration of skilled laborers. 
If their manufactories were not supported, “it is impossible to conjecture when (if ever) 
they [could] be reasonably expected to recover.”5  
Though the historical circumstance and scale of these cases are considerably 
different—the sheer magnitude and range of people tied to the failing twenty-first century 
financial institutions could not be equaled by America’s entire population in the early 
nineteenth century—the proposed solution was similar. While both groups demanded 
government assistance, only one was under the pretense that they were too big to fail. In 
nineteenth-century Delaware, manufacturers pleading for federal assistance were instead 
too fragile to survive without it. The scale of aid and the desired support significantly 
differed. While twenty-first century institutions begged for direct financial assistance in 
the form of federal money, nineteenth-century manufacturers beseeched the government 
for policies favoring domestic industries. Specifically, they desired the passage of 
mercantilist policies including: the establishment of a permanent tariff, a revision of 
Revenue Laws designed to ascertain the actual value of imported goods, and the repeal of 
drawbacks—a tax placed on the re-exportation of foreign goods—placed on gunpowder 
and other productions.6 These policies aimed to ensure equal competition between 
domestic and foreign producers and therefore differ from the monetary bailout desired by 
 
4 Society of the State of Delaware for the Promotion of American Manufactures, Wilmington Delaware, 
1817. Early American Imprints, Series 2, no. 42157, 2. 
5 Society of the State of Delaware, 1-2. 
6 Society of the State of Delaware, 6. 
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twenty-first century businesses and financial institutions. The public advantage to aiding 
these industries was considered apparent. Depicted in nationalistic terms, the prosperity 
of domestic manufactures was “a positive creation of so much wealth to the country,” and 
to neglect their upkeep was not unlike leaving “a farm uncultivated, or a mine 
unwrought.”7 The need for federal assistance in both situations was tied to the vitality of 
communities, states, and the entire nation. To let these industries fail, in other words, 
would hinder local and national development. 
Whether these manufactures were as important as they claimed is a topic for 
historical investigation, but this conception must have originated somewhere. Published 
in Wilmington, the industries referred to by the Society were largely located along the 
Brandywine and Christina Rivers in northern Delaware [see Figure 2]. The rivers’ access 
to the sea, abundant water power, and proximity to urban centers and rural hinterlands 
made them ideal for the establishment of water powered mills for manufacturing.8 Did 
these natural advantages facilitate business relationships and allow manufacturers to 
connect with a greater network of markets? Or was it the extensive scale and production 
of essential manufactures such as cotton, wool, paper, and iron that convinced the 
Society’s members of the importance of their survival? Presumably it was both.9  
 
7 Society of the State of Delaware, 7. 
8 Carol E. Hoffecker, Brandywine Village: The Story of a Milling Community (Wilmington, DE: Old 
Brandywine Village Inc., 1974), 19. 
9 Society of the State of Delaware, 1; Hoffecker, 27. 
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Figure 2: Map depicting the Brandywine and Christina Rivers, Wilmington, Delaware, 
and their proximity to Philadelphia. Source: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Christina_brandywine.png (Accessed on November 30, 
2009). 

In the Society’s petition to Congress, they noted that several industries were laboring 
under difficulties and in need of government support. One of these industries was E.I. du 
Pont’s gunpowder manufactory along the Brandywine.  In addition to being a staunch 
promoter of domestic manufactures, du Pont was also the Society’s President. During the 
war of 1812 the company’s sales increased from $86,000 (in 1810) to $292,000 (in 1814) 
at the height of the war.10 After the war’s end, company sales declined (though on 
average they never dropped to pre-war levels). It was in these transitioning post-war 
years that E.I. du Pont and the rest of The Society of the State of Delaware for the 
 
10 Nina Lorraine Edwards, “The Bookkeeping Records and Methods of E.I. du Pont de Nemours and 
Company, 1801-1834” (M.A. thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1966), Appendix A, 125. 
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Promotion of American Manufactures petitioned the government for aid.  
To understand the Society’s perception that their manufactures were too important to 
fail, DuPont presents an illuminating case study. The DuPont Company illustrates the 
interconnectedness of early American enterprises and the importance of urban, rural, and 
federal assistance in the growth of industry. Its early acquisition of federal support and its 
use of company agents created an economic network binding the company’s welfare to 
institutions and individuals across the new nation. Additionally, public and private 
customers came to rely on DuPont’s high quality powder for numerous endeavors—
fueling the company’s growth and status.  With the completion of the Eleutherian Mills 
along the Brandywine, the DuPont Company quickly generated a wide-ranging clientele 
in neighboring cities and rural settlements. From the outset, they also received 
encouragement and contracts from the federal government. Their local investments, 
governmental relationships, and economic interconnectedness throughout the growing 
nation—in the company’s relatively short existence—combined to convince E. I. du Pont 
in 1817 that it was in the government’s best interest to pass legislation ensuring the 
survival of his enterprise, as well as others in Delaware.   
A great deal of research has documented the DuPont Company’s early history. Much 
of it deals with the company’s establishment and initial struggles while painting a 
detailed portrait of its internal activity. Historians often neglect DuPont’s place in the 
emerging national economy. To remedy this, the current study utilizes the company’s 
early business records and correspondence primarily with federal officials and agents 
engaged in buying, selling, and promoting DuPont powder. These agents resided in port 
cities and rural settlements and were charged with disposing and transporting the 
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company’s gunpowder, tying them to a national and international trading network.11 
Though using familiar source material from DuPont’s records, this vantage point allows 
for an external view of the company’s dealings by focusing on demand for its products 
from individuals, agents, and government officials. The company’s employment of 
agents in cities and towns throughout the country bound their fortune to local and 
regional marketplaces. Concurrently, federal officials, agents, and retail customers came 
to rely on DuPont powder, connecting them to the mills along the Brandywine. This 
combined public and private reliance convinced the company of its importance, and the 
dangers associated with failure. Furthermore, their far-reaching business network 
motivated E. I. du Pont’s request for federal aid on the grounds that his manufactory and 
others like it were essential to the country’s development and welfare. Beginning with the 
company’s emerging relations with federal officials and venturing into their use of agents 
in cities and regional markets, this study illustrates the interconnected role of 
manufactures in the early national economy, and highlights their growing importance on 
the development of places. 
 
11 Hoffecker, 26-27. 
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Figure 3: An 1822 map depicting the location of the Eleutherian Mills, DuPont's first 
powder mills, along the Brandywine River. The additional plots represent other milling 
sites including those constructed by DuPont. Source: Norman Wilkinson, "Brandywine 
Borrowings from European Technology” Technology and Culture, No. 1 (Winter, 1963). 
 

“This Feeling of Deep Interest for your Country”:  
DuPont and Federal Support 
Before immigrating to the United States, the du Pont family established personal 
relationships with a number of prominent Americans. These early relations initiated 
lasting communication with the American government that directly benefitted the 
Company’s founding. Serving as Minister to the Court of Louis XVI prior to the French 
Revolution, Pierre Samuel du Pont, E.I.’s father, made the acquaintance of Thomas 
Jefferson, who was serving as an American foreign minster in France. The two men 
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became comrades in support of free-trade and their admiration for one another continued 
until du Pont’s death.12 When P.S. du Pont arrived in America, he brought his son’s 
desire to open a powder manufactory to Jefferson’s attention. In an 1800 letter to 
Jefferson, du Pont boldly asserted that powder was “indispensable to the defense of 
nations,” and that his son’s would “send bullets a fifth farther than English or Dutch 
bullets travel.” The letter concludes by appealing to Jefferson not to grant a government 
contract for powder before testing DuPont’s. 13 A year later, in another letter to Jefferson, 
du Pont rightly predicted that their powder would be needed for both national defense in 
the prevention of war, and in the business of the country—consisting of hunting, the 
opening of mountains and canals, and for public works.14 According to du Pont, his son’s 
powder was an essential investment for Jefferson’s government, assuring defense and 
development, two necessities for the growing nation. 
Jefferson either agreed with du Pont or decided to appease his old friend, because he 
met with Pierre Samuel’s son E.I. du Pont and encouraged him to open his proposed 
gunpowder mill. It is unclear if the du Ponts would have been convinced of their eventual 
success without assurances of government support. As the building of the powder mills 
ensued, Jefferson boosted E.I.’s confidence further by telling him that the United States 
Army and Navy had been informed to purchase DuPont powders “whenever their wants 
may call for them.”15 These statements encouraged E.I. that the government would 
provide stable business and support for his enterprise. 
 
12 Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours 1798-1817, xiii-xx. 
13 P. S. du Pont to Thomas Jefferson, December 17, 1800, Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and 
Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours 1798-1817, 28 
14 P.S. du Pont de Nemours to Thomas Jefferson, December 17, 1801, Correspondence between Thomas 
Jefferson and Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours 1798-1817, 35.  
15 Quoted in Leonard Mosley, Blood Relations: The Rise & Fall of the du Ponts of Delaware (New York: 
Atheneum, 1980), 26. 
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Figure 4: The 1801 meeting between E.I. du Pont and Thomas Jefferson, where Jefferson 
is said to have encouraged du Pont to establish a gunpowder manufactory. Image Source: 
DuPont: From the Banks of the Brandywine to the Miracles of Science (Wilmington: E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Company, 2002), 2.

In the DuPont Company’s early years, the government acted as a supplier of raw 
materials for the production of gunpowder, and as a stable customer and promoter of the 
enterprise. By purchasing powder or sending business elsewhere, the government tied the 
company to the developing nation’s welfare and facilitated the dispersal of DuPont 
powder throughout the country. This public support for a private endeavor assured the 
company of its importance in the growing economy. Furthermore, the federal 
government, through its assistance, helped DuPont locate and create a domestic 
marketplace for manufactures in the early republic. 
In several circumstances, the federal government provided DuPont with all the 
necessary materials to manufacture new powder and remanufacture old. The production 
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of gunpowder requires three key materials: sulfur, charcoal, and potassium nitrate, 
referred to as saltpeter at the time. Saltpeter was the key ingredient, and in the company’s 
founding years it was obtainable only from British-controlled India.16 The saltpeter was 
sold to governments as a product to be stored for future military needs. For this reason, it 
was essential that DuPont establish a relationship with the government to gain access to 
this necessary resource. Though it soon found other suppliers of saltpeter, the Company’s 
early government contracts relied on saltpeter stored in the Philadelphia Magazine. In 
1809, E.I. du Pont’s business partner Peter Bauduy, a French American who invested in 
the company, wrote to Callender Irvine, the Superintendent of Military Stores in 
Philadelphia, asking if the War Department still planned to furnish DuPont with the 
saltpeter necessary for manufacturing fifty-thousand pounds of powder.17  
During these years federal officials also asked the company to judge samples of 
saltpeter from domestic sources to ascertain whether it could be used in powder 
production. Writing to the Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, E.I. du Pont noted that a 
sample of Kentucky saltpeter that he had been sent was “very fine and pure.” He closed 
this communication by asserting that he had “no doubt that Kentucky and the upper parts 
of Louisiana will offer the United States great resources in Saltpeter if [its] importation 
[received] any encouragement.”18 This letter is important for two reasons. First it depicts 
the company’s and the government’s desire to find domestic sources of saltpeter, and 
their dependence on one another in doing so. And secondly, it was written within two 
years of the Louisiana Purchase, and can be read as an entrepreneurial endorsement of 
western exploration and settlement. In locating this mutually important resource, the 
 
16 Kinnane, 12. 
17 Peter Bauduy to Callender Irvine, May 1809. 
18 E.I. du Pont to Henry Dearborn, March 14 1805. 
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company and the government both supported its marketability. Furthermore, this 
highlights the role that private industry played in encouraging public action—realized 
here through the development of western markets. 
From the moment DuPont opened its mills in 1804 the company tirelessly advertised 
their manufactory to federal officials and promoted their mutual interests. In a March, 
1805 letter to Secretary of War Dearborn, E.I. du Pont announced that the company was 
ready to receive a government order for the remanufacture of thirty or forty thousand 
pounds of old powder. Several of DuPont’s initial government contracts involved the 
remanufacture of already existing powder.19 In addition to providing business, jobs of this 
nature implied a measure of trust that the company’s end product would produce 
beneficial results. In May of the same year, Dearborn arranged for Callender Irvine to 
furnish DuPont with twenty-five tons of powder to be remanufactured and instructions on 
protecting the finished powder from the elements.20 Dearborn’s satisfaction with DuPont 
was evident. In subsequent years, the government ran tests on DuPont powder, sent 
additional powder for remanufacture, and even asked the company for charcoal to secure 
the state magazine in Philadelphia.21  
In its first years of production, DuPont gained a reputation with federal officials who 
began to equate its achievements and abilities with its family name. Through 
correspondence with Dearborn and Irvine, the company continuously promoted the 
superior quality and strength of its powder. In doing so, they tied the federal 
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19 E.I. du Pont, manuscript letter to Henry Dearborn, 14 March 1805, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. 
Records, Longwood Manuscripts Group 5, Series A, Box 1, Hagley Museum and Library, Wilmington, DE.  
20 Callender Irvine, manuscript letter to E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 31 May 1805, E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co. Records, Longwood Manuscripts Group 5, Series A, Box 3, Hagley Museum and Library, 
Wilmington, DE. From this point forward, letters directed to the company will be cited as to EIDP&CO.  
21 Henry Dearborn, manuscript letter to EIDP&CO, 4 January 1807, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood 
Manuscripts Group 5, Series A, Box 4, HML; Callender Irvine, manuscript letter to EIDP&CO., Nov. 26, 
1805, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood Manuscripts Group 5, Series A, Box 3, HML. 
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government’s fortune to their own and highlighted the company’s growing importance. 
Midway through 1807, E.I. du Pont addressed a letter to General Dearborn lamenting the 
company’s inability to oblige a request for both shooting and cannon powder. Attempting 
to save face, du Pont promised that the company would “procure some soon and…have 
the honor to send it.” Trying to further evade this disappointment, he quickly directed 
Dearborn’s attention to a recent test of powder in New York. DuPont powder preformed 
admirably and displayed a considerable advantage over imported British and Dutch 
powders. His product’s clear superiority prompted du Pont to proclaim that “we have 
always found [our own powder] stronger than any one of the same description imported 
in this country.”22 Months later, again writing to Dearborn, du Pont expressed frustration 
at prejudices directed against his company. Believing these judgments were negatively 
affecting the company’s reputation, du Pont cautioned that “if the government thinks it 
can procure for itself better powder we certainly cannot complain of it, but we dare say 
that better powder is not to be found either in America or in Europe.”23 He further 
indicated that attacks against the company disadvantaged them and the government. It 
would be better for both parties, du Pont reasoned, for the government to place more 
confidence in his manufacture. As far as he was concerned, they benefitted in the 
purchase of DuPont powder as much as the company profited from selling it. Increasing 
orders for new and remanufactured powder must have validated du Pont’s reasoning and 
his consistent assertions of his powder’s superiority.24  
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22 E.I. du Pont, manuscript letter to Henry Dearborn, 21 May 1807, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood 
Manuscript Group 5, Series A, Box 1. HML. 
23 E.I. du Pont, manuscript letter to Henry Dearborn, 26 October 1807, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood 
Manuscript Group 5, Series A, Box 1, HML. 
24 E.I. du Pont, manuscript letter to Henry Dearborn 12 October 1808, and Peter Bauduy, manuscript letter 
to Callender Irvine, May 1809, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood Manuscript Group 5, Series A, Box 1, 
HML. 
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Another striking example of the government’s trust in and use of DuPont powder 
came in their willingness to employ it in diplomacy. In 1807, General John Mason, the 
nation’s Superintendant of Indian Trade, asked DuPont for samples of their powder to 
send to several Indian tribes. The Indians were “good judges of the article” according to 
Mason, and it was his official objective to “serve them faithfully and well.” Mason 
believed DuPont powder would please the Indians and he placed an order for “forty 
quarter casks of [their] best rifle powder.”25 He assured DuPont, that if they agreed to 
supply powder for native tribes, they would be called upon to do so often. This assurance 
of future business was a direct result of the Company’s expanding relationship with the 
federal government. Once again, DuPont facilitated federal business and profited from it. 
Their growing importance as a supplier of elite powder boosted their reputation and 
secured federal support that would only increase during the War of 1812.  
The timing of the company’s foundation was ideal as the United States benefited 
from an extended period of economic growth during the 1790s until the Embargo in 
1807. Additionally, it was also fortuitous timing for a manufacture of military supplies. 
Though one historian notes that this period witnessed a disruption in the close association 
between economic and military might, DuPont may have been the exception.26 In 1805, 
the United States Government tested DuPont powder and found it superior to both 
domestic and English-made powders. This caused Secretary of War Henry Dearborn to 
announce in a public statement that, in the future, DuPont would receive all the 
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John Mason, manuscript letter to EIDP&CO. December 2, 1807, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood 
Manuscripts Group 5, Series A, Box 4, HML.
26 Paul A. C. Koistinen, Beating Plowshares into Swords: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 
1606-1865 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1996), 44-45. 
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government’s business.27 E. I. du Pont’s enthusiasm over this statement was probably 
tempered by the reality that “between 1805 and 1809 Government purchases from 
[DuPont] amounted to less than $30,000 of a total of approximately $244,000” the 
company took in.28 Regardless, the government’s endorsement certainly helped DuPont 
obtain a quick reputation and credibility that was crucial to its early business networking 
and growth. The government proved its loyalty in the War of 1812 when it relied heavily 
on the company’s powder and more than doubled their production (and sales).29 
 Economic policy at the national level also assisted the DuPont Company in its 
founding years. Political attitudes began to shift in the new nation as Jefferson’s 
Republican Party assumed leadership of the Executive and Legislature. As one historian 
notes, and this analysis of DuPont helps confirm, in the years leading to the War of 1812 
the Republican and Federalist Parties appeared to switch positions on the issue of 
manufacturing and the role of the federal government in the economy.30 Long understood 
as champions of agrarianism and the self-sufficient yeoman farmers, historians have 
recently highlighted Republican efforts to promote the productivity of both agriculture 
and manufactures.31 After taking office, the new Republican administration appeased 
manufacturers by repealing an excise tax placed on them and by prohibiting the 
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27 Edwards, 12. 
28 Edwards, 12. 
29 Edwards, Appendix A, 125. 
30 Lawrence A. Peskin, “How Republicans Learned to Love Manufacturing: The First Parties and the ‘New 
Economy,’” Journal of the Early Republic, 22, No.2 (Summer, 2002): 235.  
31 Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 1790-1820 (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 19-21. Also for the former view, see Joyce Appleby, 
Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s (New York: New York University 
Press, 1984); and Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980). For the latter interpretation, see Peskin, 236; 
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1789-1812 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 150-161. 
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importation of several important British goods.32 These policies, as well as the Embargo 
of 1807, directly supported domestic manufacturers and aided their nascent development. 
Though powder was not specified as one of these British productions, this favorable 
attitude toward manufacturers created an environment where new enterprises could 
survive and flourish. The DuPont Company, one of many new manufactures opening for 
business in the first decade of the nineteenth century, benefitted from federal patronage 
and policies. 
It was certainly the case that the federal government was beginning to rely on the 
DuPont Company for its powder needs. The company however, equally relied on the 
government’s business. Location played a role in this mutual reliance. Dearborn and 
Irvine, two primary government correspondents in the Company’s early years, resided in 
the federal capital, Washington D.C., and the nation’s previous capital and current 
corporate center, Philadelphia, respectively. The DuPont powder mills were just over one 
hundred miles from Washington and a mere thirty-five miles or so from Philadelphia. 
Furthermore, Baltimore, a growing eastern port and population center was positioned 
between Washington and Wilmington, a short seventy miles away. In the census of 1810, 
Delaware was listed behind Maryland and Pennsylvania as the third largest producer of 
gunpowder in the nation.33 This might seem insignificant except for the fact that DuPont 
was the only manufacturer in Delaware, whereas the leading states had nine and twenty 
producers respectively. Located between these other producers and in close proximity to 
several developing urban centers, DuPont used the federal government’s assistance to 
create and sustain a market for its powder. 
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32 Nelson, 153. 
33 Edwards, 13. 
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Two other factors, however, were of great importance in the DuPont Company’s 
initial growth and networking. Its relationship with the government grew more intimate 
as the two increasingly relied on one another. Additionally, recognition of the superiority 
of DuPont powder traveled quickly and new customers sought to acquire it. This section 
has provided an account of the Company’s relationship with the federal government, and 
how DuPont gathered sales and support from Republican officials. The next section 
considers how the company’s use of agents allowed them to create an economic network 
that disseminated their powder across the national landscape.  
 
“To Send Them by Way of”: The Creation  
of Powder Markets 
In their founding years, the DuPont Company employed and increasingly gained new 
powder agents to sell and distribute their product across the American landscape. 
Concurrently, during the first two decades of the nineteenth century, other industrial and 
business networks were forming, connecting manufacturers, laborers, and goods with one 
another and the growing nation. Writing about the rise of machinist networks in the early 
republic, David Meyer describes them as “unifying mechanisms” where technical and 
market knowledge connected individuals and firms.34 The DuPont Company created a 
similar network that connected their industry to individuals across the national landscape. 
Their system relied on the buying and selling of goods, rather than the exchange of 
knowledge and skill. The company, utilizing their adjacency to several urban centers, 
assembled a number of agents in developing cities and towns that acted as entrepôts and 
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34 David R. Meyer, Networked Machinists: High-Technology Industries in Antebellum America (Baltimore: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), 1-2. 
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salesmen of DuPont powder. These agents actively created markets in their regions and 
communicated local demands back to the company. With a growing reputation, 
government patronage, and on-the-ground local agents, the company’s product quickly 
spread across America’s republican landscape. Not limited to a local marketplace, the 
company benefitted from geographic advantages and successfully expanded their sales 
and distribution to the mid-Atlantic region and greater eastern states. By establishing this 
interconnected business network, the company linked its stability to local economies 
throughout the nation. As their network expanded, and people and places increasingly 
relied on their powder, DuPont solidified its importance as an essential manufacturer in 
the early American economy. 
Laboring to complete construction of their powder mills in the first years of the 
nineteenth century, DuPont actively searched out and created private markets through 
which to sell their powder. By placing sales agents throughout the country, the company 
amplified demand for their powder and positioned themselves to build markets in urban 
and rural locations. Meyer has observed that local economies shifted from an internal 
focus to greater market integration during the 1790s and early 1800s. To facilitate the 
opening of markets on a national scale, manufacturers producing custom goods began 
requiring close contact between buyer and seller.35 To reiterate, DuPont achieved this by 
contracting with agents to promote its powder and operate as regional entrepôts in distant 
market centers and peripheries. From their Eleutherian Mills site just outside 
Wilmington, the company manufactured their product, arranged for its transportation, 
loaded it on ships or wagons, and sent it to agents and other customers. Upon receiving 
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35 David R. Meyer, The Roots of American Industrialization (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2003), 59. 
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powder, company agents promoted it, arranged for its sale, and disseminated it through 
local markets. Ultimately, these agents supported the company’s expansion and 
reputation by creating new, private markets that linked the company to local economies 
throughout the nation. 
One of the company’s first powder agents was the Baltimore merchant Isaac McKim. 
In 1802, E.I. du Pont visited France to collect materials and machinery for building his 
powder works. After acquiring the necessary equipment, du Pont forwarded it to 
America, specifically to Baltimore, where McKim readily received “three barrels of 
machinery” and began making arrangements for its transfer to Wilmington.36 Once 
DuPont began manufacturing powder at the Brandywine mill site, McKim wrote to the 
company regarding the scarcity of powder in his region. The supply of good gunpowder 
was deficient in Baltimore, he stated, and DuPont could expect to find available markets 
in the area. “I think there is every appearance of the articles [powder] being in demand 
and scarce for sometime to come,” and if the company had available supplies, McKim 
was sure he could sell it.37 In this manner the company procured one of its first private 
markets for gunpowder. In outlining the favorable conditions for powder sales in the 
Baltimore area, McKim secured supplies of DuPont powder and assumed the role of 
supplier for the region. Though McKim’s relations with DuPont began before the 
completion of the mills, it was not long before the Company established regular 
correspondence with other agents across the American landscape. 
In another example, the Company created a new market for its powder by acquiring 
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36 Isaac McKim, manuscript letter to E.I. du Pont, July 30 1802, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood 
Manuscript Group 5, Series A, Box 3, HML. 
37 Isaac McKim, manuscript letter to EIDP&CO, March 15 1804 and July 12 1804, EIDP&CO. Records, 
Longwood Manuscript Group 5, Series A, Box 3, HML. 
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an agent in Chestertown, Maryland. In 1804, John Chew wrote to the company that he 
received directions from three merchants of the area to procure DuPont powder. If the 
powder’s quality was approved, Chew had no doubt that “it [would] be demanded in the 
lower part of this peninsula,” and he would aid in selling it.38 Chestertown was located on 
Maryland’s eastern peninsula and was accessible by water. From this vantage point a year 
later, Chew confirmed what McKim had earlier observed, there existed a scarcity of 
British and domestic powder in Maryland. He encouraged DuPont to continue supplying 
him, noting that if their powder did not find an immediate market, its sale could be 
considerably extended into neighboring counties. In his next letter to the company, Chew 
confirmed that he adopted this strategy by sending samples of powder to a village sixteen 
miles distant.39 Determined to sell the powder, Chew and other agents acted as peripheral 
outlets that the company entrusted to scout out markets and distribute its productions. 
Though many of DuPont’s initial agents and correspondents were located relatively 
close to Wilmington, in places such as Philadelphia, Baltimore, New Castle, and 
Maryland’s eastern peninsula, the company very quickly procured agents throughout the 
new nation. Agents such as Boston’s John Hancock utilized the transportation resources 
of a large urban center to transfer DuPont powder to more geographically distant 
locations. In a letter to the company, Hancock described his ability to export large 
quantities of powder should he be provided with it. Furthermore, his location in a port 
city like Boston allowed him to receive powder on a steady basis and encourage its 
 
38 John Chew, manuscript letter to Peter Bauduy, October 5 1804 and November 2 1804, EIDP&CO. 
Records, Longwood Manuscript, Series A, Box 3, HML. 
39 John Chew, manuscript letter to EIDP&CO, November 1 1805 and December 3 1805, EIDP&CO. 
Records, Longwood Manuscript Group 5, Series A, Box 3, HML. 
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continued sale.40 Agents in upstate New York created new markets for DuPont powder in 
Albany, the growing state capital. When Victor du Pont, E.I.’s brother, passed through 
Albany, he secured a new agent in John D.P. Done & Co. Shortly after Victor’s trip, 
Done & Co. wrote to DuPont about their desire to keep a supply of powder “for the 
Western part of [their] state.”41 In the same letter, they advised that the DuPont Company 
could send future supplies through a Captain Marren who provided regular service to 
Albany. As in Boston, Albany’s location along a major waterway—in this case the 
Hudson River—allowed for consistent communication by water during much of the year.  
Cities provided additional opportunities for the sale of powder by luring customers 
from outside their borders. In several cases, existing markets within growing urban 
centers facilitated the opening of neighboring markets. In Rhode Island, where two cities 
competed for prominence, the appearance of DuPont powder in Newport fostered 
demand for an agent in nearby Providence. In 1805, Asa Ames rode thirty miles to 
Newport to purchase powder from a DuPont agent there. Writing to the company, he 
noted the necessity of undertaking this hardship because there was no agent currently 
serving his own city.42 To remedy this, Ames recommended several trusted merchants 
who could carry DuPont powder to Providence, where he would gladly purchase it. By 
illustrating this scenario, Ames highlights the role cities played in housing merchants and 
attracting customers from surrounding regions. Furthermore, through his merchant 
recommendations Ames acted as a local representative for the company and facilitated 
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40 John Hancock, manuscript letter to EIDP&CO. September 27 1806, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood 
Manuscript Group 5, Series A, HML. 
41 John D.P. Done & Co., manuscript letter to EIDP&CO., April 3 1806, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood 
Manuscript Group 5, Series A, Box 3, HML.  
42 Asa Ames, manuscript letter to EIDP&CO., November 22 1805, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood 
Manuscript Group 5, Series A, Box 3, HML. 
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the creation of a new market in Providence. Less than a year later, John Whipple became 
DuPont’s powder agent in Providence, and wrote to the company that sales were “beyond 
what [he] could have expected” despite regional prejudices against domestic powders.43 
This last example also illustrates how DuPont powder helped American’s lose their sense 
of industrial inferiority. By learning to trust and purchase domestic products—such as 
DuPont’s—over foreign ones, American’s began shifting their allegiance to their own 
manufactures, and in doing so they directly supported the growth of a national economy.  
Agents served an equally important role in emerging settlements and peripheral 
country regions. In Reading and Pittsburgh, two developing centers in rural Pennsylvania 
that organized western trade and supplied settlers and farmers, DuPont agents sent 
samples of and sold company powder to neighboring regions. In November of 1805, 
George Kein petitioned the company to serve as its lone agent in Reading. “I have sent 
samples of your powder to my friends of the country,” he conveyed in a letter to the 
company. Shortly after, Kein became Readings’ sole powder agent, and endeavored to 
sell the quantity he had received.44 A similar situation transpired a year earlier when 
DuPont obtained Joseph Barker as its agent in the emerging city of Pittsburgh. After 
receiving a stock of the company’s powder, Barker sent samples to merchants in adjacent 
towns from twenty to fifty miles away.45 In doing so, he not only established a 
distribution center for DuPont powder in a relatively peripheral settlement, he also sought 
out new customers in even more remote areas. By gathering agents in smaller 
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settlements, the company established new markets and dispersed its powder outside the 
reach and realm of traditional urban centers like Boston, New York, and Philadelphia.   
Correspondence between the company and Mitchell and Sheppard, one of its 
principal agents in Baltimore, illustrates the process by which agents secured new 
markets and distributed DuPont powder. In March of 1805, Mitchell and Sheppard sold 
forty-four casks—the standard shipping container—of DuPont powder to three 
customers. The casks were divided accordingly: twenty-two went to an S. Shaulding, 
eleven to an A. Richardson, and eleven to a Robert Hough. These three buyers, as 
Mitchell and Sheppard indicated, were “considerable dealers in the article,” and if the 
powder met their approbation, could be counted on for future orders.46 This letter depicts 
the extensive network DuPont powder traveled across before arriving in a final 
destination for use. After leaving the company’s mills, powder transferred to the hands of 
agents who sold it to customers who often resided a considerable distance from the 
agent’s establishment, and in many cases, these customers distributed the powder 
elsewhere or to customers of their own. Rather than being shipped to a single location for 
a specific use, DuPont powder was disseminated across the developing nation by agents 
working in urban centers and rural settlements. 
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Producer: E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Company (Wilmington, DE) 
 
 
Agent: Mitchell and Sheppard (Baltimore, MD) 
 
 
Dealers: S. Shaulding(22)  A. Richardson(11)  Robert Hough(11) 
 
 
Figure 5: Representing the diffusion of DuPont powder through several intermediaries. 
Beginning with the company, the powder was shipped to agents who then sold it to 
powder dealers for further sales. 

DuPont’s growing network of agents and sales, combined with a burgeoning demand 
for their powder, solidified the company’s importance in the national economy. With 
established markets throughout the eastern coast and countryside, customers began 
relying on DuPont powder for a number of uses as agents profited from its sale. As the 
company developed, the number of agents selling its powder increased, and new markets 
sustained new customers. Rapidly, the DuPont manufactory became a stable and reliable 
source for quality domestic powder throughout the country. To do so, the company 
utilized urban services for transportation and communication. One historian, describing 
the urbanization of Philadelphia and Delaware, categorizes Wilmington as a processing 
town, a transport town, and at times an organizer of trade and commerce.47 For the 
DuPont Company, the city served all these needs. Once the powder left the Wilmington 
area however, agents carried and sold it in a variety of places including cities and 
emerging settlements. The company’s strong presence in America’s early economy 
convinced them, and others, of the potential for and necessity of domestic manufacturers.    
 
47 James T. Lemon, “Urbanization and the Development of Eighteenth-Century Southeastern Pennsylvania 
and Adjacent Delaware,” The William and Mary Quarterly 24, No. 4 (October, 1967), 535. 
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Frontiers and Development 
As they often do today, industrialists in the nineteenth century actively created and 
discovered new markets for their products and utilized government support in 
establishing and maintaining success. Though the scale of modern industry differs 
quantitatively from the nineteenth century’s, early manufacturers still could justifiably 
argue the private and public value of their survival. After all, the company’s powder was 
utilized for national defense, diplomatic relations, and eventually in western migration 
and development. The market revolution that historians recognize as emerging after the 
War of 1812 was developing at least a decade earlier in some important ways such as the 
growth of domestic markets and industrial production.48 By linking their interests with 
the federal government’s and employing agents to disseminate their powder to remote 
regions, the DuPont Company created institutional networks. The number of agents they 
employed rose steadily in the first several years of production as demand increased and 
they provided for new markets. Though production and sales dropped after the War of 
1812, the company was already established enough to compose a legitimate argument 
asserting their importance. 
In the summer of 1804, E.I. du Pont was assured of the government’s commitment to 
his enterprise, meanwhile his agent in Philadelphia was already scouting markets for 
saltpetre.49 In 1813, when the company was inundated with war orders from the 
government, rather than appease investors, E.I. du Pont diverted company profits to the 
 
48 For a discussion of the post-1812 market revolution: Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian 
America, 1815-1846 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 3-5. 
49 Archibald McCall, manuscript invoice to E.I. du Pont, July 21 1804, EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood 
Manuscript Group 5, Series B, Box 17, HML. 
60 
 
construction of a new powder mill site on neighboring land.50 The acquisition of the 
Hagley powder yard in 1813 is a testament to the faith E.I. du Pont placed in the 
company’s longevity. Not long afterward, as he presided over the Society of the State of 
Delaware pleading for government aid, du Pont’s intuition proved correct. The company 
continued to survive and prosper, all the while adding to their footprint on the 
Brandywine shoreline.  
In 1808, E.I. du Pont ventured to rural western Virginia to inquire about available 
supplies of saltpetre. In letters of introduction, War Department official John Roberts 
asked that du Pont be given “all the aid and assistance” in procuring this resource.51 
Occurring while the country was saddled with the Embargo Act of 1807, banning trade 
between the United States and other nations, it is clear that du Pont, with the 
government’s blessing and support, was searching for alternative supplies. With the 
Embargo in place, the company was forced to abandon its traditional English and Indian 
sources of this essential raw material and inquire instead about its availability within the 
United States. Increasingly, they turned to the west where “vast repositories of [the] 
material,” were being discovered and mined in the mountains and caves of Kentucky and 
Tennessee [see Figure 6].52 Again, the availability of these resources was made possible 
by a growing national state and policies that necessitated the gathering of raw materials 
and the development of western mining sites and economies. 
 
50 William H.A. Carr, The du Ponts of Delaware (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1964), 90. 
51 John Roberts, manuscript letter to John Harvest and Thomas Kinkeade, August 10 &16 1808, 
EIDP&CO. Records, Longwood Manuscripts Group 5, Series C, Box 49. 
52 “From the NY Columbian, Gypsum,” The Enquirer, October 25, 1811 (Richmond, Virginia), [Early 
American Newspaper Series III, 1690-1922], 4. Also see “Report of the Secretary of Treasury on 
Manufactures,” National Intelligencer, May 14, 1810 (Washington DC), [Early American Newspaper 
Series III, 1690-1922], 1, for the presence of saltpetre in Kentucky and Virginia.  
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
Figure 6: A nineteenth century map depicting the layout and corridors of Kentucky’s 
Mammoth Cave, now a national park, owned by Lexington, Kentucky saltpetre dealer 
Charles Wilkins. During the early 1800s, and probably beginning after E.I. du Pont 
travelled through Kentucky and West Virginia, Wilkins sold saltpetre to the company. 
Places like Mammoth Cave were important sources of domestic raw materials. 
Additionally, the company’s business, and that of others undoubtedly played a role in the 
marketing of these materials and therefore the development of their mining locations. The 
details on the map highlight the availability and abundance of saltpetre in this particular 
location. One caption reads: “[The cave] has been explored about 7 miles from the 
termination of the narrows. The clay impregnated with Nitre has been found to be 
generally about 5 feet thick extending quite across the cave. Under this clay is a vast 
body of fine dry sand, the depth of which has never been ascertained. The clay in the 
principal cave produces 6lbs of saltpetre to every bushel, the sand produces one to the 
bushel.” Source: Map, An Eye-Draught of the Mammoth Cave in Warren County [Ky], 
n.d., Winterthur Manuscripts, W4-5033.jpg, Hagley Museum and Library. 
 
 Intimately connected to the federal government through mutual interests, the DuPont 
Company persevered through the financially precarious beginnings of American 
industrialization. In subsequent fragile moments, when the company felt compelled to 
justify their importance to obtain federal aid, they presented a strong case and referred to 
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the creation of an economic network that spanned the entire nation. Additionally, by 
supplying government needs the company solidified itself as an important participant in 
the early American economy. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 LOCATION AND CREATION: THE MID-ATLANTIC, WILMINGTON,  
AND DUPONT’S WORKING ENVIRONMENT 
Innovative Spaces and Creating Places 
Brilliant ideas, innovations, and technological achievements are often recognized as 
the fruit of individual genius inventors, influential industries, or powerful organizations. 
Thomas Edison, in particular, is synonymous with invention. The Rockefeller, 
Vanderbilt, and Carnegie families are all renowned for industrial power and wealth. 
Today, high technology companies such as Apple are noteworthy for the ubiquitous iPod 
and iPhone, while others like Google dominate internet email and search technology. The 
same notoriety applies to the DuPont Company and family. Their legacy as an American 
gunpowder company and international chemical corporation is over two centuries old. 
One journalist has referred to the family itself as “unique,” noting that though “a number 
of families have been as rich…the du Ponts have conserved their wealth, adding to it 
generation after generation.”1 Even the company’s founder, Eleuthère Irénée (E.I.) du 
Pont, espoused his ingenuity and skill. Writing to his father during the company’s first 
full year of production, he touted that his “powder is not only infinitely better than any 
other made in this country, but it is several degrees above that imported from England.”2 
But, while it may seem clear that individuals and groups provide the creativity, ingenuity, 
and know-how to foster new ideas, products, and companies, it is also revealing to 
consider that innovation takes place in certain geographic communities and spaces.  
 
1 William H.A. Carr, The du Ponts of Delaware: A Fantastic Dynasty (New York: Dodd, Mead & 
Company, 1964), 1-2. 
2 E.I. du Pont to P.S. du Pont de Nemours, October 12, 1804, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont from 
Contemporary Correspondence, 1804-1807, Volume 7, trans. B.G. du Pont (Newark: University of 
Delaware Press, 1925), 12.  
64 
 
In a recent blog post previewing his new book, the New York-based journalist Steven 
Johnson has analyzed creative places. His Where Good Ideas Come From: The Natural 
History of Innovation focuses on the cultural and natural systems that spawn creativity. 
For Johnson, this book “tries to grapple with the question of why certain environments 
seem to be disproportionately skilled at generating and sharing good ideas.” He offers 
several wide-ranging examples, including the information networks of the web, the 
Enlightenment-era postal system, public spaces in metropolitan cities, and the notebooks 
of great thinkers.3 In his earlier work, The Ghost Map, Johnson provides a more in-depth 
and historically specific example of an innovative environment. This work recounts a 
deadly cholera outbreak in mid-nineteenth-century London that led to the discovery of 
the disease’s waterborne nature.4 In the city’s dense and dirty urban environment, a 
neighboring surgeon and a local priest cooperated to locate the epidemic’s original source 
in a Broad Street water pump. They did this by creating a map charting the daily patterns 
of neighborhood residents and therefore determined that those who died all shared their 
water from the same source. For Johnson, John Snow and Henry Whitehead’s triumphant 
discovery resulted from their amateurism—as far as their knowledge of cholera was 
concerned. They were able to locate the disease’s source through engaged observation 
and an “intimate knowledge of the community.”5 London’s enormous size, dense living, 
and unique communities brought about the essential variables for a new and innovative 
approach to the cholera virus.  
Aside from amateur ingenuity, background projects—secondary and tertiary projects 
 
3 Steven Johnson, “Where Good Ideas Come From,” Stevenberlinjohnson.com, entry posted June 7, 2010, 
http://www.stevenberlinjohnson.com/2010/06/where-good-ideas-come-from.html (accessed June 8, 2010).  
4 Steven Johnson, The Ghost Map: The Story of London’s Most Terrifying Epidemic—and How It Changed 
Science, Cities, and the Modern World (New York: Riverhead Books, 2006). 
5 Johnson, The Ghost Map, 202. 
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engaged in to supplement or augment a primary enterprise—also perform a valuable role 
in the formation of good ideas. Urban theorist Jane Jacobs has particularly observed the 
innovative and economic benefit that come from such projects.6 In The Economy of 
Cities, Jacob provides the example of Mrs. Ida Rosenthal, a seamstress from New York 
who began manufacturing brassieres. Dissatisfied with the way her custom dresses hung 
on customers, Rosenthal “began experimenting with improvements to underclothing and 
the result was the first brassiere.” Soon Rosenthal devoted herself to manufacturing, 
selling, and distributing brassieres full-time.7  It is assumed from this that the diverse and 
dense urban marketplaces of New York City were ideal for the success of this particular 
background project. Without a diversified customer base, willing to purchase custom 
dresses and concerned about the “right” fit, Rosenthal’s brassiere business would likely 
not have grown as it did. Again specific environments, and in these cases, those that 
facilitate amateur designs and background projects, are responsible for the eventual 
success of new ideas and companies.  
Something else, however, can be learned from both Johnson’s and Jacob’s examples. 
The individuals and groups who benefit from creative environments also have a role in 
shaping those environments. In the examples already mentioned, Snow and Whitehead’s 
revelations about cholera helped discredit miasmatists and supported the construction of a 
 
6 It is worth noting that the DuPont gunpowder manufactory, as previously discussed, was itself a 
background or secondary plan. That this plan ultimately succeeded lends support to the importance Johnson 
and Jacobs accord to background plans as a source of innovation. See Chapter VII, “The Eighth Plan,” in 
Carr, The du Ponts of Delaware; and Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours to Jacques Bidermann, New York, 
December 1, 1800, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont from Contemporary Correspondence, 1799-1802, 
Vol. 5, trans. B.G. du Pont (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1924), 191-192. In another example, 
Robert Fulton’s development of an operating steamboat and the marketing of it to passengers in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century was also a background plan. According to Kirkpatrick Sale, Fulton spent 
much of his time trying to perfect canal technology and submarines for the English, French, and United 
States’ governments before turning his attention to steamboats. See, Kirkpatrick Sale, The Fire of His 
Genius: Robert Fulton and the American Dream (New York: The Free Press, 2001), Chapters IV and V. 
7 Jane Jacobs, The Economy of Cities (New York: Random House, 1969), 51. 
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system of sewer lines and new public health standards, while Rosenthal created a new 
industry that undoubtedly generated similar businesses elsewhere and left behind a 
physical footprint.8 
A number of scholarly works have engaged the ways individuals and groups 
constructed urban and economic environments. In America’s early national era 
specifically, the period when the DuPont Company emerged and matured, several 
historians have analyzed the individual and collective bodies responsible for increased 
property values, urban growth, public projects, and entrepreneurial establishments. For 
John Lauritz Larson, the years after the American Revolution compelled George 
Washington and other founders to promote “internal improvements,” or the building of 
canals, roads, highways, and bridges. George Washington in particular, personally 
believed the ability to navigate the country’s numerous river systems and waterways was 
of the utmost importance. Certainly his desire to “bind the wilderness communities to the 
union by chains of commercial interest” was shared by other commercial and 
development boosters, at least at the regional or local levels.9 In Philadelphia, a vibrant 
culture of coastal merchants and businessmen, before and after the Revolution, not only 
developed much of the city’s wharves and waterfronts, but also “[linked] the city’s 
hinterland with its overseas market.”10 Similarly, by the 1830s in Philadelphia, 
corporations and corporate power influenced the city proper as well as “its contiguous 
suburbs and an increasingly populous and productive hinterland stretching from northern 
 
8 Johnson, The Ghost Map, 205-208. 
9 John Lauritz Larson, “‘Wisdom Enough to Improve Them’: Government, Liberty, and Inland Waterways 
in the Rising American Empire,” in Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert  Ed. Launching the “Extended 
Republic” The Federalist Era (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1996), 230. 
10 Thomas M. Doerflinger, A Vigorous Spirit of Enterprise: Merchants and Economic Development in 
Revolutionary Philadelphia (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 76. 
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Delaware to central Pennsylvania.”11 Enterprising individuals, influential “societies”, and 
government bodies, all helped construct and shape early America’s environment.12 
Scholars have also explicitly equated the ways that environments both help energize 
innovation and are themselves the products of innovators and innovations. Geographer 
Allan Pred most significantly has explained the phenomena in contemplation here: How 
do creative environments influence the individuals that inhabit them? And how do 
individuals produce and change spaces through which to exercise their interests and 
desires? Pred suggests that the relationship between people and their environments is 
dialectical, with individuals acting as both objects and subjects.13 Depicting humans as 
creators of their environments, Pred claims that “whether place refers to a village or a 
metropolis, an agricultural area or an urban-industrial complex, it always represents a 
human product.”14 Yet, humans are also subject to their own territorial creations. This is 
most evident in the presence of certain dominant institutions or projects that control 
social environments. These dominant projects “usually structure daily paths by taking 
time-allocation and scheduling precedence over both other institutional projects and 
projects undertaken alone outside of any institutional context.”15 The structures, 
institutions, and transportation networks erected by humans, therefore, create a type of 
path-dependency that regulates their movements and behaviors and that of others.  
 
11 Andrew M. Schockett, Founding Corporate Power in Early National Philadelphia (Illinois: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2007), 9.  
12 For other works dealing with the individual, collective, economic, and cultural construction of 
environments in antebellum America, see especially: Elizabeth Blackmar, Manhattan for Rent, 1785-1850 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); for a discussion of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1991); and Carol Sheriff, The Artificial River: The Erie Canal and the Paradox of Progress, 
1817-1862 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1996). 
13 Allan Pred, “Place as Historically Contingent Process: Structuration and the Time-Geography of 
Becoming Places,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 74, No. 2 (June, 1984): 280. 
14 Pred, “Place as Historically Contingent Process,” 279. 
15 Pred, “Place as Historically Contingent Process,” 282. 
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This overview of innovative spaces, environments, and the development of places 
relates to the establishment of DuPont’s powder manufactory in the early nineteenth 
century: an important part of DuPont’s legacy stems from its construction of a working 
and social environment. Today, the Hagley Museum and Library preserves the remnants 
of DuPont’s material environment and the techniques of early American powder 
production and water-powered milling. Not far away, the family’s Winterthur estate and 
Longwood Gardens remain picturesque on the landscape and serve as premier tourist 
attractions. Yet, despite E.I. du Pont and his descendants’ innovative thinking, practical 
management, and vigorous defense of their business, they could not conjure gunpowder 
out of thin air, nor could they succeed in creating a powerful company without the 
support and use of the environments around them. Though the location of factories, office 
buildings, and homes continues to be important in today’s world, it was critical for new 
industries in early America when weather patterns were less discernible, communication 
slower, raw material availability was often subject to distant trade, and transportation was 
less reliable, available through few outlets and only at certain times of the year. 
Additionally, for mills running on waterpower, finding a constant water source and 
properly manipulating it to provide energy for several waterwheels made selecting the 
right location even more essential.  
In analyzing the DuPont Company’s first two decades, it is clear that the family’s 
emigration to America and the company’s establishment along the Brandywine facilitated 
the development of a strong and lasting powder manufactory and chemical company. 
Their contribution toward economic growth and their place within a manufacturing 
community resulted both from what they did and where they were. Likeminded industries 
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and manufactories occupied the landscape around them and neighboring cities competed 
for international and internal trade while cultivating vast hinterlands. Individuals across 
the mid-Atlantic and eastern seaboard encouraged the company, offered professional 
services, and maintained close friendships. Still the diverse and economically competitive 
region where the company chose to locate did not spell success alone. Rather, they had to 
vigorously transform and expand their industrial production site, gain capital to further 
develop it, and utilize surrounding resources for power, production, and livelihood. In 
constructing their “working environment,” the company faced numerous natural and 
industrial challenges that threatened to temporarily halt production or end it all together.16 
All the while, they developed new manufacturing sites for gunpowder production, 
expanded into wool production, raised livestock, and engaged in agricultural pursuits. 
Early on, the company created a community for its powder workmen and their families 
and during the War of 1812 the du Pont family gathered together a militia and helped 
train soldiers to protect their mills and others located along the Brandywine. Industrial 
and entrepreneurial growth and environmental development formed in a cyclical 
relationship with one another; as the environment stimulated creativity, that creativity 
reciprocated by shaping and determining the future environment.   
This chapter analyzes the geographical factors that influenced the DuPont Company 
and how it simultaneously constructed a working environment during its first two 
decades. The first section considers the economic and structural developments occurring 
in the Wilmington and mid-Atlantic region. The account further argues that the region’s 
geography, built environment, and creative activity offered a model environment for the 
 
16 The term “working environment” is borrowed from Arthur F. McEvoy, “Working Environments: An 
Ecological Approach to Industrial Health and Safety,” Technology and Culture 36, No. 2 (April, 1995): 
S145-S173. 
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company’s gunpowder manufacture. This was particularly the case due to Wilmington’s 
industrial community and quick access to national and international marketplaces. The 
second section focuses on the company’s efforts to select an exemplary location for the 
manufacture and their construction of a working environment on the site. Again, the two 
sections work together to show how environment, development, and activity shape the 
nature of new innovations and further constructions. Such developments then proceed to 
organize and influence the world around them. In the DuPont Company’s founding years, 
Wilmington, Delaware’s geography was fitting for the establishment of new 
manufactures, and the city’s entrenched residents actively promoted commerce and 
industry. On deciding to settle there, the company and family helped develop the 
landscape around the city and became energetic and influential contributors to its 
community of producers.  
 
Environment and Society in Wilmington  
and the Mid-Atlantic 
In the spring of 1802, E.I. du Pont purchased a plot of land adjacent to the 
Brandywine Creek a few miles outside the nucleus of Wilmington, Delaware. In short 
time, the site became home to both du Pont’s family and his reputable and rapidly 
growing gunpowder manufactory. DuPont’s presence along the Brandywine, however, 
was not the only development taking place in Delaware or the greater mid-Atlantic region 
during this time. Rather, the region—including Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and 
parts of New York and Virginia—was dynamically growing, changing, and diversifying. 
By 1800, population numbers in the region’s key cities, Baltimore, New York, and 
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Philadelphia, all surpassed those of any other city in the nation.17 Furthermore, these 
cities’ links to their extensive hinterlands tied together a great portion of the United 
States’ growing national economy.  
 
 
Figure 7: Map of the American coast and mid-Atlantic region circa 1813. Depicted are 
the states of Delaware, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and parts of New York and 
Virginia. Also included in the lower center is a listing of the populations for the principal 
cities along the coast. Wilmington’s population is listed at 4, 416 persons. Source: Map 
of the American coast from Lynhaven Bay to Narraganset Bay/ by John Melish; engraved 
by H.S Tanner, 1813, Imprints Department, mapAmericanCoast181300001.tif, Hagley 
Museum and Library. 
 
 
17 The four largest American cities and their populations at the turn-of-the-century were: New York, 
60,515; Philadelphia, 41,220; Baltimore, 26,514; and Boston, 24,937. See, Allan Pred, “Manufacturing in 
the American Mercantile City: 1800-1840,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 56, No. 2 
(June, 1966), 310.  
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These and other factors influenced E.I. du Pont’s decision to establish his powder 
manufactory in New Castle County, Delaware, and they helped shape the company’s 
early success. This geography that offered a beneficial and resource rich landscape for the 
company’s use, was complemented by a competitive economic culture hopeful of 
improving domestic production, markets, communication, and transportation. DuPont’s 
beginnings in this time and place energized and secured the company’s fortunes as it 
began and strengthened its operations.  
In the early nineteenth century, Delaware State, and the city of Wilmington in 
particular, quietly expanded in the shadow of Maryland and Pennsylvania, its larger 
neighbors. In 1809, Wilmington’s growth required that the city reestablish its charter to 
facilitate an increased population and size. The opening words to its new charter 
remarked that, the previous document, composed in 1739, “hath from the increased 
population of [the] borough…been found incompetent to the good government and well-
being of the same.”18 Because of its size, Wilmington could no longer rely on old 
governing systems. Instead, its urban growth, concentrated between the Brandywine 
Creek and Christina River—much the way Philadelphia was situated between the 
Delaware and Schuylkill Rivers—hinted at the emergence of a multi-use landscape 
attractive to merchants, manufactures, and farmers. One historian suggests that 
Wilmington at this moment “was as much a central place as a processing center.”19 
Ultimately, due to its geographically advantageous position between two rivers, close 
proximity to the much larger Delaware River and Bay, and central location between 
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18 “An Act to Alter and Re-establish the Charter of the Borough of Wilmington,” Delaware Laws, Statutes, 
etc., 1809, passed at Dover, January 31, 1809, Wilmington, Jones, 1809, Early American Imprints, Series 2, 
no. 50936, 3. 
19 James T. Lemon, “Urbanization and the Development of Eighteenth-Century Southeastern Pennsylvania 
and Adjacent Delaware,” The William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, 24, No. 4 (Oct., 1967), 526. 
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Philadelphia and Baltimore—both larger merchant towns—Wilmington, perhaps 
somewhat uniquely for a smaller city, was able to develop a diversified economy and 
community as it entered the nineteenth century 
Yet, economic diversity aside, Wilmington remained best known for its mills and 
manufactures. Unlike neighboring Philadelphia and Baltimore, Wilmington’s economy 
was based largely on production and processing. This was the case, in part, because in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, manufactures only existed outside of the country’s 
most populous cities. According to Allan Pred, manufacturing was characterized 
predominately by “rural dispersion rather than concentration in major urban centers.”20 
Pred notes that shortages in capital, technology, transportation, and the cost of labor, 
often conspired to situate manufactures outside the city.  In addition to these reasons, the 
populous cities on America’s eastern seaboard tended not to focus on manufactures 
because they had already established themselves as shipping centers and marketplaces. 
When manufactures did exist in these cities, they were either of a smaller scale or were 
located along the city’s urban edge where waterpower and land was available. In 
Wilmington, however, manufacturing grew up alongside the city and therefore became an 
intimate part of its development. Once again its location between Philadelphia and 
Baltimore meant, especially by the beginning of the nineteenth century, that Wilmington 
did not have to be a shipping or trading powerhouse. Rather, its location in between these 
two cities secured Wilmington’s role as an essential processor for the immense 
hinterlands of other marketplaces and a key networking site between them.  
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20 Pred, “Manufacturing in the American Mercantile City,” 307. 
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Figure 8: Wilmington, 1804. Map depicting Wilmington situated between the 
Brandywine and Christina Rivers. At the bottom left, the Christina River flows in to the 
Delaware River. At the Bridge crossing the Brandywine Creek, in the map’s upper left, is 
the location of the Brandywine Mills where the route becomes a road leading to 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  In the upper center, Kennet Road leads out of the city and 
runs almost parallel to the Brandywine. Adjacent to this road, and four or five miles 
outside Wilmington, is the location of DuPont’s Eleutherian Mills. Source: Plan of 
Wilmington and its Environs, Wilmington, DE, maps, map1804wilmington09731.tif, 
Hagley Museum and Library.
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The availability of waterpower was of additional importance for attracting aspiring 
manufacturers and facilitating milling operations in the Wilmington area. In the early 
national United States, before the wide use of coal, steam, and oil, water served as the 
most reliable energy source for early industrialists. Reliance on water-powered wheels to 
operate manufacturing machinery determined where milling communities emerged and 
where industrialists could locate production facilities. A modern historian recognized this 
while observing that in America, “manufacturing districts were rural and depended upon 
the new country’s as yet unexploited resources of water power.”21 Not all manufacturing 
districts remained rural, even if they began that way. From its initial establishment, 
Wilmington possessed the necessary waterpower, and shortly thereafter the technological 
know-how, to fuel the operation of industrial mills.  
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, numerous authors commented on 
Wilmington industrialists’ reliance on the city’s adjacent rivers, and specifically on the 
Brandywine Creek’s powerful falls and current. Originating in a large river basin in 
Southeastern Pennsylvania, the Brandywine Creek is forty miles long with a three-
hundred foot decent. For one observer, the river’s features made for “a fine stream…well 
adapted to water works.” Furthermore, to fully attest to the Brandywine’s attractiveness 
to industrial producers, the same author counted ninety-nine distinct water powered 
facilities along the creek, with none extending beyond nine miles from the city.22 Though 
manufacturers had to acquire riparian rights to secure this water power, Wilmington’s 
location between the Brandywine, Christina, and Delaware rivers ensured there would be 
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21 Anthony F.C. Wallace, Rockdale: The Growth of an American Village in the early Industrial Revolution 
(New York: Knopf, 1978), 5. 
22 “Wilmington, Delaware, and its Vicinity,” Niles’ Weekly Register, October 7, 1815, 9, 214, American 
Periodicals Series Online, 93-95. 
76 
 
a great deal of productive space available. Undoubtedly, this played a role in luring new 
manufactures to the city and its surrounding environs. 
Wilmington’s maturation as a productive city, due in part to its geography, made it an 
attractive place for new manufactures to settle. But the city’s culture and past were also 
influential in shaping its industrious spirit. In the 1730s, a few enterprising individuals 
constructed several of the country’s first merchant mills alongside the Brandywine Creek 
just as the city was coming into being. Known simply as the “Brandywine Mills,” this 
collection of mostly flour mills gained a national reputation, and according to one author, 
contributed greatly to the city’s growth and “kept it from the atrophy that other towns 
suffered under the commercial shadow of Philadelphia.”23 Joseph Scott, a contemporary 
geographer observing Maryland and Delaware in the early nineteenth century, remarked 
that the Brandywine Mills, with the exception of those within the vicinity of Baltimore, 
were the most valuable collection of mills in the United States. They consisted of 12 mills 
for grinding flour and a single saw mill. Additionally, Scott noticed the mill’s prodigious 
production, mentioning that “they grind annually about 300,000 bushels of wheat and 
Indian Corn; but if they were constantly supplied with grain, they would grind 400,000 
bushels.”24 Based on these remarks, the mills were so efficient as to outpace available 
raw materials.  
By the time the du Pont’s arrived in Wilmington, they settled in an economically 
active place extending beyond the influential presence of the Brandywine Mills. The 
city’s proximity to the Brandywine and Christina, as well as its two-mile distance from 
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23 Lemon, “Urbanization and Development,” 526. 
24 Joseph Scott, A Geographic Description of the States of Maryland and Delaware: Also of the Counties, 
Towns, Rivers, Bays, and Islands (Philadelphia: Kimber, Conrad & Co., 1807), Early American Imprints 
Series, Series II, Shaw-Shoemaker (1801-1819), 170. 
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the Delaware River, meant that shipping and transportation also preformed a vital role in 
its economy. For the State of Delaware, Wilmington functioned as an important point of 
entry and was the only state port that carried on trade with foreign nations.25 The city was 
also an important stocking port for vessels traveling from Philadelphia down the 
Delaware River.26 The significance of shipping as a livelihood for some Wilmington 
citizens is recognizable in their outrage over a 1799 Philadelphia quarantine act. The act 
made it mandatory for any incoming ship, bound for the Port of Philadelphia, to first stop 
at the Philadelphia Lazaretto before proceeding to unload any of its passengers or cargo. 
This created an uproar among Wilmington merchants who argued that Philadelphia, 
under cover of protecting itself from infectious disease, was “aiming at a monopoly of the 
trade of the Delaware.”27 Their response to the act was economic and political. 
Philadelphia’s attempt to govern Delaware’s economy by routing trade through its own 
filters was perceived as “inimical to the trade of [Delaware], and a violation both of its 
Federal, and Sovereign Rights.” For frustrated Wilmington merchants, “the disguise of a 
quarantine law,” did not conceal “the views of commercial interest.”28 With their interests 
in jeopardy, the city’s merchant community joined together and resisted their larger and 
more influential neighbor. The manifestation of their disagreement in the form of a 
petition attests to the act’s potential threat to their interests and those of the city in 
general. Though it may metaphorically have stood in Philadelphia’s shadow, 
Wilmington’s merchants, along with its manufactures, were instrumental in the city’s 
economic stability and growth. 
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25 Scott, A Geographic Description, 179. 
26 Scott, A Geographic Description, 177. 
27 Wilmington, Delaware Merchants, “At an Adjourned Meeting of the Merchants,” (Wilmington: J. 
Wilson, 1801), Early American Imprints Series, Series II, Shaw-Shoemaker (1801-1819), 1. 
28 Wilmington, Delaware Merchants, “At an Adjourned Meeting,” 2. 
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Together, Wilmington’s manufacturers, merchants, and artisans largely cooperated to 
form an economic community and culture motivated to create new and better market 
goods and determined to promote the city’s welfare, develop its internal and surrounding 
infrastructures, and attract new producers and citizens. The manufacturing community 
sought to achieve these goals in part through improvements in new machinery that 
promised to enhance productivity through a division of labor that allowed workers to 
focus on distinct sections of the production process. Improvements in flour processing 
brought on by private investment and inventions along the Brandywine helped strengthen 
their already well developed reputation. In 1791, when Oliver Evans introduced his new 
automated grist mill—a mill for grinding grain into flour—that was several stories tall 
and largely operated without manual labor, using conveyor belts and pulley elevators, it 
caused one local to remark in the General Advertiser that “to such perfection are our grist 
and merchant mills brought, by the assistance of [this automated mill], that we may 
say…that they are not equaled in the world.”29 Later, in 1817, a writer in Niles’ Weekly 
Register had a similar attitude about the practical application of new technologies at the 
Gilpin’s paper mills. In this case, the introduction of new machines for manufacturing 
paper on an expanded scale was again calculated to save on labor as the mills now did the 
work of ten paper vats. Most applicable to Wilmington’s community of manufacturers 
was the writer’s final reflection that the Gilpin establishment, as part of the greater 
neighborhood, “will aid its improvement, and add to the valuable manufactories on the 
Brandywine.”30 In this case, “improvement” refers to the gain in private wealth and 
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29 “Wilmington, March 2,” The General Advertiser and Political, Commercial, Agricultural and Literary 
Journal [Philadelphia, Pennsylvania], March 14, 1791, Issue 141, 3. 
30 “Manufacture of Paper,” Niles’ Weekly Register, November 29, 1817, 13, 326, American Periodicals 
Series Online, 223. 
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public reputation that commentators believed these new designs and increased output 
would bring to the city and its surrounding region. For manufacturers, the success of 
specific inventors and industries in the Brandywine community was alluring. 
Furthermore, producers were not satisfied with mechanical innovation and improvements 
to their own operations. Instead, in the early nineteenth century, they actively sought to 
boost economic opportunity for all by supporting public and private works that helped 
shape and develop the city and its region. 
Following the American Revolution, influential groups and societies throughout the 
new nation actively promoted the development of necessary public infrastructure such as 
roads, canals, and bridges, to facilitate commercial and information exchange. Local and 
national governments greatly contributed to these efforts by providing stability and acting 
as organizing bodies for those with the means and desire to initiate internal projects. 
Wilmington’s many industrialists and citizens were no exception to this. In 1806 for 
example, the Delaware Legislature passed an act incorporating a company to erect a 
bridge over the Brandywine Creek. Several Wilmington producers were appointed to 
execute this project, including Thomas Lea, James Canby, and William Poole, merchants 
who owned mills along the Brandywine.31 Two years later in 1808, the Legislature 
passed an act creating a company to construct a turnpike road from Wilmington to the 
Delaware and Pennsylvania state line. Once again the commission was composed of 
Wilmington merchants and millers, this time including Jacob Broom—the previous 
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31 Delaware Senate and House of Representatives, “An Act to Incorporate a Company for the Purpose of 
erecting a Stone Arched Bridge over the Brandywine Creek,” Laws of the State of Delaware, Vol. IV 
(Wilmington: M. Bradford & R. Porter, 1816), 12-23. 
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owner of the DuPont’s Eleutherian Mills site.32 In promoting and endorsing these 
projects, many manufacturers and merchants believed they would not only be improving 
communication between their own and neighboring towns, but also facilitating access to 
new resources and the opening of new marketplaces for their goods. This was the case 
with the proposed Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. Though not completed until 1829, 
work began on the canal following its incorporation in 1802. After a number of 
construction delays and insufficient revenue, the Canal Company’s president and 
directors made one of several petitions to the United States Congress in 1809 for 
protection and aid. One of the company’s directors was Joshua Gilpin, a Wilmington 
manufacturer and proprietor of the aforementioned paper mills. Gilpin, along with the 
company’s president and other directors, argued that the canal was instrumental in 
linking together a key region of the nation’s commerce, and also in unifying the country 
politically. If the canal was not completed, they suggested, the nation would “not only 
cease to increase in its agricultural, commercial, and manufacturing importance, but must 
sink below the level of its neighbors in its political consequence.”33 In its fragile early 
years of independence, America’s political autonomy depended on its economic strength 
and viability. Additionally, the Canal Company’s petition was suggestive of an active 
interstate competition that continued to animate the behaviors of local and regional 
economic boosters. To ensure that their areas could maintain a competitive edge, it was 
crucial for individuals from cities like Wilmington to create infrastructure, and facilitate 
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32 Delaware Senate and House of Representatives, “An Act to incorporate a company for making a turnpike 
road from the borough of Wilmington, to the line between this State and Pennsylvania,” Laws of the State 
of Delaware, Vol. IV (Wilmington: M. Bradford & R. Porter, 1816), 196-214. 
33 U.S. Congress. Senate. The Memorial and Petition of the President and Directors of the Chesapeake and 
Delaware Canal Company, January 24, 1809, 10th Congress, 29, Washington, Weightman, 1809, Early 
American Imprints, Series 2, no. 18956, 5. 
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market activity. Ultimately, these improvements in transportation, shipping, and 
communication encouraged the development of specific places, regions, and the entire 
nation. 
In the first decades of the nineteenth century, such efforts transformed Wilmington 
into a profitable location for the establishment of new industries and manufactories. 
Fortuitously located between two larger cities that organized the hinterlands and trade 
around them, Wilmington utilized neighboring resources and capitalized on its role as a 
manufacturing community. The city’s advantageous geography, containing multiple 
rivers and abundant water power, and manufacturing tradition was attractive to new 
producers hoping to establish and grow their businesses. Together the natural and built 
environments spawned a community determined to promote its interests and 
achievements and develop its surroundings. While the citizens of Wilmington 
undoubtedly relied on neighboring cities for important resources and financial support, 
they also challenged the hegemony of those places. As one historian observed, “even 
though Wilmington had numerous tanneries, foundries, shipbuilding firms and the like, 
the men who owned these businesses saw themselves in competition with rivals in other 
cities rather than with one another.”34 Furthermore, the sheer number of milling sites 
along the Brandywine and Christina testified to Wilmington’s productivity and 
importance. Yet, of all the industrial establishments and geographic improvements that 
materialized during this period, it was, as one contemporary declared, “those belonging to 
the Duponts [sic]” that were most worthy of attention, “as here a village has grown up 
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34 Carol E. Hoffecker, Wilmington, Delaware: Portrait of an Industrial City, 1830-1910 (University Press 
of Virginia, 1974), XV.  
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with in a few years.”35 DuPont was able to construct this working “village” because 
industrialists, merchants, and the citizens of Wilmington, through private and public 
endeavors, constructed a networked environment and manufacturing community that 
harnessed natural resources and facilitated economic exchange. With an understanding of 
the natural advantages and occurrences that made Wilmington an ideal industrial city, 
this account now turns to the DuPont’s efforts to utilize this environment and further 
shape and develop it.  
 
Creating a Working Environment: Selecting a Site  
and Industrial Organization 
In April of1802, E.I. du Pont departed from New York and passed through Bristol 
and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on route to Wilmington, Delaware. Within days of 
arriving, Irénée completed the purchase of an eighty-acre wooded milling site owned by 
the Quaker and patriot Jacob Broom.36Several days before, his father, Pierre Samuel du 
Pont, congratulated him on the impending purchase. “We are very glad that you are 
satisfied with your purchase,” the elder du Pont exclaimed, “and that you will have help 
from [Mr. Broom] with your building.”37 In the completing their acquisition of this land, 
the du Ponts also received a water dam, a millrace, the remnants of a milling building, 
and a wealth of trees and agricultural plots that already occupied the purchased acres. 
Due to the presence of these resources and structural “improvements,” this purchase 
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35 “Wilmington, Delaware, and its Vicinity,” Niles’ Weekly Register, October 7, 1815, 9, 214, American 
Periodicals Series Online, 93.  
36 From personal expenses of E.I. du Pont, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont from Contemporary 
Correspondence, 1802-1804, Vol. VI, trans. B.G. du Pont (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1925), 
18-19; and E.I. du Pont to Jacob Broom, March 30, 1802, Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, 11. 
37 Pierre Samuel du Pont de Nemours to E.I. du Pont, New York, April 27, 1802, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée 
du Pont from Contemporary Correspondence, 1802-1804, Vol. VI, trans. B.G. du Pont (Newark: 
University of Delaware Press, 1925), 31. 
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signified a crossroads for the DuPont Company, rather than a beginning. This future site 
of the Eleutherian Mills was only settled upon after a long search for the right 
environment in which to establish the company. Additionally, the site’s ultimate selection 
began a new period of developing the internal and external landscape to accommodate 
the needs of a productive gunpowder manufactory. Building a productive landscape 
capable of turning out thousands of barrels of gunpowder every year required more than a 
dam, millrace, and a few milling buildings for stamping and mixing the powder. Instead, 
constructing and operating the necessary mills and buildings for manufacturing and 
storing the powder placed demands on the local and surrounding ecology while creating a 
workplace environment that structured the family and workers’ daily lives and influenced 
the growth and concerns of an early American city.  Overall, the DuPont’s economic 
world and culture shaped the development of the land and governed its relationship with 
Wilmington and its surrounding environs.  
Before the DuPont Company built a working environment for their powder 
manufactory, they had to secure a proper location for its development. In searching for 
the ideal place to establish the company, the natural features of different geographies 
played a crucial role. First and foremost, an abundant water source was needed to provide 
a year-round supply of waterpower. Additionally, the presence of other resources 
including wood and stones for building, access to waterways and ports for shipping, 
proximity to raw materials, and the accessibility of labor sources and marketplaces, were 
all important factors contributing to E.I. du Pont’s decision of where to locate his 
manufacture.  Initially, Washington City, the nation’s new capital, was thought to be the 
most ideal location, as government business was considered essential to the new 
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company’s survival. Yet, upon observing the Chesapeake region’s potential for a powder 
manufactory firsthand, E.I. du Pont was appalled. Writing to his father while still in 
Georgetown, he remarked that “there is absolutely no opportunity in Maryland or 
Virginia near Federal City,” rather “the country, the people, [were] all worthless.” Almost 
as an afterthought at the end of the letter, Irénée mentioned that he would, “stay a day at 
Wilmington to see the Brandywine.”38  Of course this trip turned out to be fruitful, and 
resulted in several return trips, as du Pont found a favorable site in Broom’s land. In 
addition to the Brandywine’s available waterpower, the creek offered a communication 
channel directly into Wilmington, and through the city, a connection to the Delaware 
River’s busy shipping thoroughfare. Furthermore, du Pont calculated that Broom’s land 
would save money on the construction of the milling site itself because it contained 
sufficient quantities of wood.39 This wood was such a necessary addition that the deal 
was almost cancelled when du Pont came to believe Broom was cutting down and 
removing the precious oak. He expressed this frustration in several letters to Peter 
Bauduy and his family, and did not relax about the issue until Broom assured him that he 
had not cut any of the oak, and instead only a small amount of chestnut used to construct 
a fence.40 Ultimately, DuPont decided to purchase Broom’s property due to its 
advantageous location and the presence of key natural resources. 
Another factor that ensured the company’s selection of Broom’s Brandywine site was 
its proximity to urbanizing Wilmington. For du Pont, the site’s location a few miles 
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38 E.I. du Pont to P.S. du Pont de Nemours, Georgetown, September 19, 1801, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée 
du Pont from Contemporary Correspondence, 1799-1802, Vol. V, trans. B.G. du Pont (Newark: University 
of Delaware Press, 1924), 280.  
39 E.I. du Pont to Peter Bauduy, New York, October 7, 1801, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. V, 
294-295. 
40 E.I. du Pont to Peter Bauduy, Philadelphia, January 2, 1802; and Peter Bauduy to E.I. du Pont, January 9, 
1802, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. V, 338-340. 
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outside the city was favorable both for its remoteness from the urban center and for its 
nearness to it.  E.I. du Pont worried about cities’ distractions when he suggested, while 
still searching for the proper site for his manufactory, that “this location need not be near 
a city,” and “on the contrary the discipline that should control the workmen makes it 
desirable to be at some distance from cities,” though he added that this was only true 
“provided there is proper facility for transportation by water.”41 Another beneficial reason 
for maintaining a measureable distance from cities, especially those on America’s east 
coast, was disease. Yellow fever was a recurring problem on the mid-Atlantic coast as 
E.I. du Pont’s brother Victor reminded him. After the family settled along the 
Brandywine, Victor, who was still in New York, alerted his brother that “the papers say 
that the yellow fever is increasing in your neighborhood every day,” and to “not go too 
often to the city.”42 By keeping one’s distance in the country, it was much easier to avoid 
the diseases and distractions often associated with cities or more densely populated 
environments. 
The drawbacks to being within or too near a city were often outweighed, however, by 
the personal and economic opportunities they offered. In E.I. du Pont’s case, not only did 
Wilmington provide an ideal environment for his powder mills and essential natural 
resources, it also housed numerous French émigrés that assisted the DuPont Company’s 
early development. During the 1790s and early 1800s, Philadelphia and parts of Northern 
Delaware attracted a number of Frenchmen and French-speaking refugees from 
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41 E.I. du Pont, “The Location and Construction Necessary for Manufacture of Gunpowder,” in Life of 
Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. V, 206. 
42 Victor du Pont to E.I. du Pont, New York, October 26, 1802, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. 
VI, 132. 
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upheavals in revolutionary France and the French colony Santo Domingo.43 A number of 
these French immigrants settled in Wilmington and provided important cultural ties 
without which it is unclear that the company would have located and survived where it 
did. Two individuals, Peter Bauduy and William Hamon, were particularly helpful to the 
company’s early establishment, both settled in America years earlier, learned to speak 
English, and were engaged in business around Wilmington. E.I. du Pont was not a native 
English speaker, and because of this the relationship he formed with these two men, both 
refugees from Santo Domingo, allowed him to navigate the laws, procedures, and 
relationships necessary to purchase land in Delaware. Du Pont’s friendship with these 
men was another pull-factor that convinced him to settle along the Brandywine. Writing 
to Bauduy, who eventually invested heavily in the company and served a number of years 
as one of its proprietors, E.I. du Pont highlighted the advantages of settling near 
Wilmington. The city offered “the ease of making shipments,” he explained, “and the 
pleasure of being near you and your family.”44 That both Bauduy and Hamon arranged 
the purchase of Broom’s land with Hamon’s name on the title further suggests that these 
cultural acquaintances assisted the company.45 Overall, the advantages of being both near 
and slightly distant from the city made Broom’s land on the Brandywine the ideal place 
for the company’s founding. 
After taking residence along the Brandywine, E.I. du Pont set about erecting several 
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43 Catherine Hébert, “French Publications in Philadelphia in the Age of the French Revolution: A 
Bibliographic Essay,” Pennsylvania History 58, No. 1 (January, 1991), 37. 
44 E.I. du Pont to Peter Bauduy, New York, Novemeber 30, 1801, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. 
V, 314. 
45 E.I. du Pont to William Harmon, Wilmington, April 26, 1802, Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. VI, 
29-30. Non-citizens could not purchase land in Delaware during this time. This necessitated an 
arrangement where Broom’s land was purchased by William Hamon and later turned over to E.I. du Pont. 
Some of the restrictions on what non-citizens could and could not purchase in the state are elaborated in, 
“An Act to enable aliens, in certain cases to purchase and hold lands, or other real estate with this State,” 
Laws of the State of Delaware, Vol. IV (Wilmington: M. Bradford & R. Porter, 1816), 483-484. 
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mill buildings to begin producing gunpowder. Along with the mills, the DuPont 
Company employed several laborers to dig out millraces and construct additional 
buildings to dry and store completed powder. In early 1803, E.I. du Pont wrote to his 
father about the construction’s progress, noting that they had “in three months built a 
large house and barn of stone and a large part of the refinery…the water course and the 
saw mill,” but they still had to build “three mills, one or two other buildings…a new race 
for one of the mills,” and “quarters for the men.”46 Clearly the mill site was a large 
project, as the process of producing gunpowder required multiple steps with the 
ingredients—saltpetre, sulfur, and charcoal—being mixed together, pressed, glazed to 
remove moisture, dried, and stored. Each one of these steps—and this is not a 
comprehensive list—required a separate building that occupied a distinct space at the mill 
site. The capital, planning, and labor expended to complete the mills was just the 
beginning. In churning out the first barrels of powder in May of 1804, the DuPont lands 
became a working environment once again.47 In noting this, it must not be forgotten that 
the flowing water, dams, millraces, waterwheels, machinery, workmen, and employers 
were conspiring toward a shared end. The production of gunpowder from numerous 
compositional parts was the purpose that drove the company, the people, and the 
resources it used to obtain this goal.   
But as driven as it was by production, DuPont’s mills and working landscape served 
more than economic ends. One historian suggests that early American factories “were 
about organization as much as the length of work rosters or the roar of intricate 
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46 E.I. du Pont to Du Pont de Nemours, Eleutherian Mills, February 7, 1803, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du 
Pont, Vol. VI, 164-165. 
47 The “again” refers to Jacob Broom’s previous cotton mill, although it was much smaller in scale, that 
occupied the land prior to the DuPont’s arrival. For discussion about the first barrels of powder, see Victor 
du Pont to E.I. du Pont, New York, May 1, 1804, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. VI, 306. 
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machines.”48 This observation applies well in DuPont’s case as the Eleutherian Mills site 
not only organized and coordinated gunpowder production, but also the family’s lives 
and business duties, and the social and economic lives of those employed by the 
company. Whether as the recipient of bags of saltpetre or barrels of sulfur, such as those 
sent to the company by Victor du Pont in 1803, or as the site of a willow tree farm—used 
to make charcoal—or as a place for cultivating produce, the mills along the Brandywine 
operated as a central place that organized the lives of those who lived and worked there.49 
Much like the plantation landscape that organized the American South’s economy and 
social life, milling communities and large manufactories had the same influence on their 
surrounding populations. Before occupying the Brandywine location, E.I. du Pont asked 
Jacob Broom to prepare for his coming by plowing a clover field, planting corn and 
potatoes—two staple and multipurpose crops—and putting fences around the pasture 
lands. The sooner these preparations were made the better, because by the spring of 1803 
the company already employed forty men that needed constant supervision and 
direction.50 When by 1829 the company employed 127 men, and had 335 people living 
on company property, it was clear the DuPont mills were more than just a few productive 
buildings.51 Rather, in addition to the manufactory, with its own purpose to create powder 
and generate wealth, the site served the daily needs of workers and their families.   
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48 Jonathan Prude, “Capitalism, Industrialization, and the Factory on Post-Revolutionary America,” in 
Wages of Independence: Capitalism in the Early American Republic, ed. Paul Gilje (Madison: Madison 
House, 1997), 87. 
49 For the saltpetre and sulfur, see Victor du Pont to E.I. du Pont, New York, May 13, 1803, in Life of 
Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. VI, 221-222; and for the willow trees used to make charcoal, see Roy M. 
Boatman, The Agricultural Establishment at the Eleutherian Mills, 1802-1834 (Eleutherian Mills Historical 
Library, 1961), 16. 
50 E.I. du Pont to William Hamon, New York, May 17, 1802, and E.I. du Pont to Du Pont de Nemours, 
Philadelphia, June 12, 1803, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. VI: 55, 236. 
51 Margaret Mulrooney, “Labor at Home: The Domestic World of Workers at the du Pont Powder Mills, 
1802-1902,” (PhD diss., College of William and Mary, 1996), 38. 
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Other significant ways the company organized their Brandywine landscape were 
through efforts to acquire new lands and expand their production, to construct housing for 
workers, and to maintain a balance between the living and working environment. After 
purchasing Broom’s land, E.I. du Pont, as head of the company, consistently added new 
property to his initial holdings. Between 1810 and 1818 alone, the company made eight 
separate land purchases ranging in size from around twenty acres to several that were 
well over one hundred acres.52 Included in these purchases was Rumford Dawes’ 
Brandywine property that became the Hagley Mills powder yard. This land was used for 
several purposes as portions were set aside for agricultural cultivation and as pasture for 
the company’s growing collection of merino sheep. The company also used the land to 
provide housing for its workers. Many of the company’s laborers were immigrants, and 
after training these workers in their safeguarded procedures, the company hoped to 
maintain their loyalty. One way they did so was by inviting the workers to live, along 
with their families, adjacent to the company’s manufacturing mills. “Between 1806 and 
1814,” according to one historian, “four semi-detached stone houses and two detached 
houses…were added to the property.” Located just above the powder yard, these homes 
provided accommodations for ten workmen and their families.53 In 1810, the company’s 
subsidiary textile manufactory, DuPont, Bauduy and Company, also added forty-five 
houses for mill operatives.54 It is almost assured that many of the two company’s 
workers, and proprietary families themselves, worked and lived on company property.  
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52 Roy M. Boatman, The Agricultural Establishment at the Eleutherian Mills, 1802-1834 (Eleutherian Mills 
Historical Library, 1961), 12.  
53 Mulrooney, “Labor at Home,” 192-193. 
54 Mulrooney, “Labor at Home,” 194. 
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Figure 9: A map of the property owned by E.I. du Pont in 1826. The inscription notes 
that the land contains two hundred and eighty six acres with five perches. The larger 
house in the upper center is Eleutherian Mills, the du Pont family’s home. Below the 
house, and along the river, are several of the company’s first mills. On the left, and once 
again abutting the Brandywine, is the Hagley Mills site acquired in 1813. It is also 
apparent that large portions of the property are undeveloped or contain few permanent 
structures. This land was used for farming, pasture, and resource cultivation—such as the 
willow trees for charcoal production. Source: Lands Owned by E.I. du Pont, Fairlamb 
Survey, 1826, Longwood Manuscripts, Group 9, Series C, 20100616_fairlamb_0001.tif, 
Hagley Museum and Library.  
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With living quarters and workplace occupying a single landscape, the DuPont 
Company’s manufactory operated as a small scale community. The site became an early 
company town or industrial village, where most employees lived in single-family 
dwelling units “built closely together, like urban houses.”55 Between 1809 and 1814 the 
company built a store where workers could purchase necessities. 56 Yet, it is not always 
helpful to think of Eleutherian Mills as a self-sustaining community with only limited 
contact to an outside world. Rather, E.I du Pont ensured that this would not be the case by 
locating his manufactory a short distance from Wilmington. His family and company 
workers were therefore able to maintain ties with other businesses, religious institutions, 
and personal relations residing in the city or along the Brandywine. During the War of 
1812, the DuPont Company reinforced their commitment to national defense by 
responding to a warning that their powder mills were a likely British target. To counteract 
the potential threat, the company joined with neighboring Brandywine manufactures to 
organize a brigade of men and defend their surrounding territory.57 This volunteer 
regiment, known as the Brandywine Rangers, was eventually disbanded after the 
Delaware State Legislature repealed a law exempting manufactures from militia duty. 
This frustrated E.I. du Pont as he believed the volunteers to be better organized and 
armed than the state militia.58 Shortly thereafter, some of these volunteers likely joined 
neighboring militia forces at Camp DuPont where they formed a 3,600-person-strong 
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55 Mulrooney, “Labor at Home,” 201. 
56 Mulrooney, “Labor at Home,” 194. 
57 In May of 1813, Madame de Pusy, E.I. du Pont’s sister in law who was living in Philadelphia at the time, 
relayed a message from a General Moreau about the potential threat to the company. See Madame de Pusy 
to E.I. du Pont, Philadelphia, May 6, 1813, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont from Contemporary 
Correspondence, 1811-1814, Vol. IX, trans. B.G. du Pont (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1925) 
92.  
58 E.I. du Pont to Callender Irvine, February 7, 1814, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. IX, 172. 
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brigade.59 These men were not only willing to defend their homes and neighbors’, but did 
so voluntarily and as part of a larger community.  
Though much went on socially for those who lived their lives on DuPont’s 
Brandywine property, the workplace environment was perhaps the greatest way that the 
company organized and regulated the landscape.60 While structures such as the powder 
yard gates marking the boundary between home life and work life, were commonplace in 
other factories or manufacturing villages, the DuPont Company utilized some unique 
designs. E.I. du Pont’s family home was built on a hill overlooking the river and milling 
sites. Interestingly, once again blending family and work life, the house doubled as E.I.’s 
office space and had a balcony where he could oversee the mill workers.61 The company 
used other techniques to observe and regulate the workplace, especially after the mills 
were damaged following several explosive accidents between 1810 and 1820. The deadly 
1818 explosion in particular was partially blamed on a negligent foreman. Because of 
this, E.I. du Pont “stipulated that at least one member of his family must personally 
oversee the yard at all times.”62   
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59 “Cadwallder; Camp Dupont; Philadelphia,” Weekly Aurora, December 6, 1814, Vol. 5, No. 32 
(Philadelphia), 256.  
60 In “Labor at Home,” Margaret Mulrooney describes some of the common social and workplace 
occurrences at the DuPont mills. Most of the single men who worked and lived on DuPont property were 
housed in dormitories, while families often received use of a house, garden, and cow pasture. This implies 
that those who lived on the property also engaged in some degree of agricultural labor and food production. 
At DuPont, workers lived in desegregated communities as the company seems to have assigned housing 
“more on the basis of family size” rather than on occupation, ethnicity, or religion. Mulrooney, “Labor at 
Home,” 188. Also, in addition to the presence of a general store on the property, the company, along with 
E.I. du Pont’s eldest daughter, helped establish a school for their workers’ children.  Furthermore, many 
Irish workers indulged in alcohol consumption and found various other ways to assert their independence at 
work and in the community. Mulrooney, “Labor at Home,” 41-42.  
61 Mulrooney, “Labor at Home,” 193. 
62 Mulrooney, “Labor at Home,” 38-39. 
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Industrial Accidents along the Brandywine 
Powder explosions and subsequent fires posed a threat to the milling site, and the 
company’s entire property. E.I. du Pont acknowledged that such explosions were 
inevitable, so he composed a unique architectural plan for his mills with this hazard in 
mind. Instead of a single large mill or factory building, Irénée divided production 
between several smaller buildings. Furthermore, instead of a solid structure with four 
solid walls, he designed the mills with only three solid stone walls and a fourth wall, the 
one facing the river, made of flimsy wood. The roof was also built with wood and slanted 
to face the river.63 Though not always successful in containing larger explosions, this 
design was certainly effective in some cases and lessened the degree of damage in others. 
As one newspaper account of an 1820 explosion at the company reveals, “the improved 
method adopted by Mr. DuPont…is successful.” It goes on to describe that when one of 
the mills exploded, “the roof was thrown into the creek,” but no person was hurt and the 
rest of the mills continued to operate “as if no explosion had taken place.”64 This 
“improved” mill design and the other particularities of DuPont’s built-environment took 
into account the importance of workplace safety and organization.  
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63 Adrian Kinnane, DuPont: From the Banks of the Brandywine to the Miracles of Science (Wilmington: 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 2002), 12. 
64 “Mr. Dupont; Powder Mills; Thursday”, Alexandria Gazette & Daily Advertiser, June 21, 1820, Vol. XX, 
No. 5821 (Alexandria), 3.  
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Figure 10: E.I. du Pont’s drawing and design for a rolling mill on his site. This drawing 
shows the slanted roof design meant to direct any potential explosion out over the water. 
Also in this picture are the three solid sides of the mill, with the roof and fourth side 
made from wood. Source: E.I. du Pont Drawings of Powder Mills and Machinery, No. 
119, Roll Mills, n.d., Drawing, Gunpowder, Factories, dupontdrawing_11900001.tif, 
Hagley Museum and Library. 
  
Explosion and workplace accidents were ever present in powder mills, and it was 
more of a question when not if another would happen. The ever present specter of 
industrial accidents highlighted the often cruel reality of many working environments. 
The historiography of industrial accidents has particularly emphasized the economic and 
social costs to both the industrialists and workers involved. This is understandable, as 
early nineteenth century reports concerning mill fires and explosions often mentioned the 
number killed and the cost of damages.65 But more recently, historians including Jamie 
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65 For an example of the estimated costs, following a fire that destroyed a grist mill and two homes, see: 
“The Destruction of Valuable Mills by Fire,” Poulson’s American Daily Advertiser, February 3, 1815, Vol. 
44, No. 11921 (Philadelphia), 3. 
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Bronstein have shown that the early nineteenth century focus on workers’ emotions and 
individual heroics kept contemporaries from asking how the workplace could be made 
safer or who should bear the cost of accidents.66 Arthur McEvoy depicts the workplace as 
an ecological system with the worker’s body at its core. Industrial accidents are, 
therefore, the ecological consequence of workplace organization and regulation.67 Both 
authors offer strong analyses and are correct in many respects, except that, 
uncharacteristic for industrial producers in this period, DuPont tried to build safety into 
the workplace and offered compensation and aid to the families of those killed by 
workplace accidents. 68 What neither author mentions, however, is that industrial 
accidents often extended beyond the workplace itself and posed risks to workers’ homes 
and families, neighboring towns, and the natural environment. 
Accidents resulting in explosions at the DuPont gunpowder mills are well 
documented in both family correspondence and newspapers. Though many of the 
accounts present personal details and descriptions of company damage, they also describe 
the impact that accidents had on the landscape and on surrounding spectators. On the 
morning of March 19, 1818, the company was hit with its most devastating explosion to 
date and for some time to come. While E.I. du Pont was away in Philadelphia on 
business, a fire ripped through the upper powder yard destroying the pounding mill, 
powder magazine—where they stored finished powder—and several other buildings. At 
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66 Jamie Bronstein, “Caught in the Machinery: The Cultural Meanings of Workplace Accidents in Victorian 
Britain and the United States,” Maryland Historical Magazine, 96, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), 163. 
67 Arthur McEvoy, “Working Environments,” S156. 
68 For intentions to provide pensions to workers’ families following a 1815 explosion, see Antoine 
Bidermann to E.I. du Pont, Pittsburg, June 16, 1815, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont from 
Contemporary Correspondence, 1814-1819, Vol. X, trans. B.G. du Pont (Newark: University of Delaware 
Press, 1926), 94-95. Additionally, following the 1818 explosion, a Philadelphia fund “collected for the 
relief of the families which suffered at the explosion of the Brandywine,” raised six hundred dollars to 
further secure the millworker’s families. See, “Wilmington, 8th April, 1818,” American Watchmen, April 
25, 1818, Vol. 1, No. 81 (Wilmington), 4. 
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least thirty-five people were killed and several others were injured, including some 
family members of the workers. Descriptions of the dead were brutally honest. A 
relatively mild account of the incident explains that “The bodies of most of the deceased 
were blown into pieces and scattered at great distances from each other.”69 E.I. du Pont’s 
wife Sophie and his brother-in-law Charles were both injured in the accident. The 
family’s house was also heavily damaged, as the “windows, floors, and roof…were 
blown off.”70 Most interestingly, regarding the company’s connection with its 
environment, reporters also described damage to the natural surroundings. “The fences, 
trees, [were] all leveled to the ground,” one reporter remarked, and “some large hickories 
are twisted and broken as if struck by lightning.”71 Furthermore, the blast shocked 
Wilmington, as citizens poured out from their houses to discover the commotion’s 
source. It was initially feared that the city itself might have been damaged by the blast.72 
So, while these explosions were undoubtedly devastating for the company on a number of 
levels, they were also an intimate part of its working environment. To produce their 
gunpowder, the company organized the soils and trees, the creek that powered their 
machinery, and the workers’ bodies who labored to create the powder. Additionally, 
because the possible magnitude and reach of an explosion was so great, and since the 
company was located only a short distance from the city, the families of workers, the 
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69 “Chronicle,” Niles’ Weekly Register, April 4, 1818, Vol. 14, No. 344, American Periodicals Series 
Online, 103. For another good, general description of the explosion, see “Thursday, Powder Mills, Mr. 
Dupont; Brandywine; Wilmington,” Village Record, March 25, 1818, Vol. IX, No. 459 (West Chester, 
Pennsylvania), 3. For a partial list of those killed, see “The Explosion,” American Watchman, March 25, 
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70 “The Late Dreadful Explosion,” City of Washington Gazette, March 25, 1818, Vol. 3, No. 116 
(Washington DC), 2. 
71 Dupont’s Powder Mills,” Washington Whig, March 23, 1818, Vol. 3, No. 140 (Bridgeton, New Jersey), 3 
72 “Dupont’s Powder Mills,” Washington Whig, March 23, 1818, 3. Some people as far away as Lancaster, 
Pennsylvania reportedly felt the explosion and believed it to be an earthquake. See, Village Record, March 
25, 1818, 3. 
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owners who lived on site, and the citizens of Wilmington all shared the potential risks of 
an industrial accident. 
In short, after selecting a site for their powder works along the Brandywine Creek in 
Northern Delaware, the DuPont Company quickly shaped the landscape around it. An 
advantageous location to inaugurate a new business, the company joined Wilmington’s 
and the Brandywine region’s active community of manufacturers, merchants, and skilled-
laborers. On several hundred acres of land accumulated over a twenty-year period, the 
company erected dams on the creek, millraces, waterwheel powdered mills, stone 
quarries, family and worker housing, and engaged in both agriculture and silviculture on 
the land. The world they built along the Brandywine went far to organize the social and 
economic lives of those who worked and lived there. As the company continued to grow 
and abut against other manufactures and landowners along the Brandywine, it became 
more and more a part of Wilmington’s extended landscape. Furthermore, the working 
environment was not contained by the site’s imaginary property lines, fences, and gates. 
When explosions happened at the manufactory, they ravaged the lives of those who lived 
and worked at the mills, damaged non-human life, and threatened the security of 
neighboring lives and structures. As the company progressed into the future and grew 
economically, it increasingly shaped and organized a working environment whose 
influence extended beyond its enclosures and into other realms.   
 
Urban Growth and Industry 
In the early decades of the nineteenth century, Wilmington, Delaware’s geography 
and society made it a beneficial place for industrial and agricultural production. One 
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historian noted that compared to other regions in Europe and the United States, no 
equivalent area rivaled that of the Northeastern United States for navigable or power 
producing rivers, and none were bordered by as fertile lands as those in the Delaware and 
Chesapeake regions.73 Wilmington, in particular, was situated between two power-
producing rivers and adjacent to the Delaware’s navigable thoroughfare. Additionally, the 
community of manufactures, merchants, and agricultural producers in and around the city 
actively promoted their trades and facilitated public works to streamline transportation 
and improve development. In 1811, Delaware even passed a law to encourage and assist 
manufactures within the state. The law exempted artificers and workmen “concerned or 
employed as such in the manufacture of paper, iron, gun-powder, woolen yarn, woolen 
cloth,” and others, from service in the state’s militia. Additionally, it outlawed and issued 
penalties against attempts to seduce or lure workers away from their employers.74 Though 
passed after the DuPont Company’s establishment, but seemingly with their stability in 
mind, this law further attests to the general importance afforded to manufactures in the 
state. Ultimately, the state and city’s geography, beneficial location between two growing 
metropolises, and economic community encouraged the du Ponts to locate their powder 
manufacture along the Brandywine Creek and begin creating a working environment. 
After selecting their location, the DuPont Company proceeded to construct 
production and living facilities that organized the landscape around them. Because the 
property included employee and family housing, it operated as a small urban community 
 
73 Thomas C. Cochran, “Early Industrialization in the Delaware and Susquehanna River Areas: A Regional 
Analysis,” Social Science History, 1, No. 3 (Spring, 1977), 288. Though this paper does not engage it, the 
Quaker culture and mentality is critical for a more holistic understanding of economic growth in this 
region. 
74 Delaware Senate and House of Representatives, “An Act to Encourage the Establishment of Certain 
Manufactories Within this State,” Laws of the State of Delaware, Vol. IV (Wilmington: M. Bradford & R. 
Porter, 1816), 397-400. 
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ensconced in a rural hamlet outside of Wilmington. Over time, the manufacture, and 
those who lived there, became an important part of urbanizing Wilmington. As the 
company continued to grow physically, it abutted against other manufactures that lined 
the Brandywine. Along with its neighbors, the Eleutherian Mills formed a contiguous link 
of milling sites and settlements leading into Wilmington. Not long after establishing the 
company, E.I. du Pont became actively involved in city life. In early 1808 he purchased 
stock in the Wilmington Library Company and made annual payments for his family’s 
use of the Wilmington Bridge.75 Years later, in 1817, du Pont acted as president for the 
Society of the State of Delaware for the Promotion of Manufactures. Not only did this 
group meet in Wilmington, but many of its members were du Pont’s neighboring 
manufacturers. Furthermore, the continued growth of his company ensured that the du 
Pont family would be influential in Wilmington for years to come.    
This is all to say that the company’s growth and built environment were a part of 
Wilmington’s overall development. Certain environments and places often attract 
different types of creativity and innovation. Once they do, those innovators, activists, and 
industrialists participate in, build, or mold the environments around them. Wilmington’s 
environment and society in the first decades of the nineteenth century were ideal for new 
manufactures. This was not only the case for DuPont, but for other entrepreneurs such as 
the Tatnall and Gilpin families, who improved flour grinding and paper making 
procedures respectively.76 Close proximity and transportation to markets, waterpower, 
 
75 Jacob Broom to E.I. du Pont, Wilmington, January 8, 1808, and Edward Gilpin to E.I. du Pont, 
Wilmington, April 17, 1810, in Life of Eleuthère Irénée du Pont, Vol. VIII, 14 and 265-266.  
76 In 1817, Thomas Gilpin introduced America’s first endless paper machine, based on English models, to 
his mills along the Brandywine. The machine revolutionized the industry and “forced other paper 
manufactures to mechanize their plants.” Harold B. Hancock and Norman Wilkinson, “The Gilpins and 
Their Endless Papermaking Machine,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 81, No. 4 
(Oct., 1957), 391. In the early 1700s, Joseph Tatnall’s family established gristmills along the Brandywine 
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sources for finance and labor, and an industrious spirit all contributed to DuPont and 
these other manufacturers’ stability and growth. That DuPont and other companies 
maintained a prominent place in and helped organize Wilmington’s landscape over the 
past two-hundred years attests to the lasting influence of innovation on spatial growth. 
Though many factors supported urban growth in Wilmington, and the mid-Atlantic, 
during the early republic and into the nineteenth century, the presence and proliferation of 
industries like DuPont, and their organization of the built-environment, should be more 
thoroughly contemplated. Additionally, the congruence of factors that generate 
innovative environments can help historians understand the culture that fueled America’s 
economic growth. 
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that soon anchored a contingent of active merchant mills in Wilmington. Hoffecker, Wilmington, 
Delaware: Portrait of an Industrial City, 5-6.  
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CONCLUSION  
Walking the grounds of the Hagley Museum and Library on the urban edge of 
Wilmington, Delaware, one can enjoy the rustling sounds of the Brandywine River, take 
shade under a towering black walnut tree, or be startled by a scampering groundhog as it 
makes its way across a graveled road. Yet, interspersed throughout this idyllic rural 
scenery are a number of built structures that have occupied the immediate landscape for 
over two-hundred years as part of the DuPont Company’s original powder mills. Stone 
buildings and working water mills, remnants of the Eleutherian Mills, have been carefully 
preserved to serve as educational tools and entertainment for the researchers, students, 
and visitors that venture to the museum each year. Ensconced in this scenic and guarded 
environment is one of the country’s best remaining relics of early American 
industrialization.  Few places offer such a remarkably intact view of the working and 
living spaces of industrial laborers and entrepreneurial families. In a world where change 
occurs at a rapid pace, and where homes and factories are regularly destroyed or built 
anew, the Hagley Museum’s grounds contain a number of structures that have survived 
the last two centuries. It is unlikely these structures would continue to persist had the 
DuPont Company not been motivated by a national economic culture that encouraged 
entrepreneurs to engage in institutional growth and development. 
In the decades following the Revolution, Americans increasingly moved away from 
an international economy based on shipping and foreign markets for surplus agriculture 
to a more self-sufficient national economy. Individual entrepreneurs and companies 
utilized this national dialogue to promulgate the necessity and importance of domestic 
innovation and industrial production. An emerging trans-Atlantic industrial capitalist 
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culture spurred the actions of these individuals and manifested in their attempts to 
establish markets and exchange networks for domestically produced goods. The DuPont 
Company was a key participant in this nationalizing economy. Its proprietors vigorously 
defended the national importance of their gunpowder and sought to ascertain a reputation 
for unsurpassed quality. The company also employed a network of sales agents to 
disseminate its powder throughout the United States. Not to forget the role of the state, 
the federal government was active in offering vocal and material support for new 
manufacturers—as the DuPont case shows—and eventually in offering legislative 
support through the embargo and subsequent tariffs. Yet, despite the increased attention 
paid to domestic producers, industrial growth was only largely occurring in specific 
geographies. Places like Wilmington, Delaware were well suited for manufacturing and 
the city’s proximity to some of the nation’s more prominent commercial centers made it 
an early site of innovative and industrial activity. 
This economic culture entailed a form a physical development that is visible in 
DuPont’s organization of the landscape around it. The company planned a working 
environment where workers and their families lived out their economic, and much of 
their social, lives. In doing so, DuPont erected an early industrial village that maintained 
important connections to Wilmington. As one author suggests, E.I. du Pont imagined his 
powder facilities and workers’ housing as “a kind of ‘middle landscape’ between the city 
and the wilderness.”1 By highlighting the industrial village’s role as a middle territory 
between the city and wilderness, one might draw comparisons to modern discussions 
about the role of suburbs in urban growth. If twentieth-century suburbs and individual 
development sites were small-scale “nuclei in the penumbra” of their neighboring cities, 
 
1 Mulrooney, “Labor at Home,” 210. 
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that filled in over time, industrial villages and edge settlements had a similar relationship 
to America’s early cities.2 Industrial communities were instrumental in shaping 
America’s built environment and urban layout. DuPont’s working environment at the 
beginning of the nineteenth-century was one of several along the Brandywine that 
maintained important links to neighboring cities—especially Wilmington—and utilized 
their resources. DuPont’s continued growth into the twentieth century has seen it become 
even more a part of Wilmington’s everyday existence. The company’s current 
headquarters are located in the city’s downtown, while numerous industrial factory sites 
and family mansions remain in the surrounding area.  
 In 1872, with some temporal distance from America’s initial period of 
industrialization, Elizabeth Montgomery, a Wilmington citizen, recalled an anecdote 
illustrating the innovative mentality that gripped a number of Americans at the turn of the 
eighteenth century. On the day train cars commenced running from Wilmington, a young 
Elizabeth encountered a man who excitedly explained that, years earlier, his father had 
met the mechanical innovator Oliver Evans who remarked that “the time was not far off 
when it would be only a day’s journey from Philadelphia to Baltimore, and that carriages 
would be invented to go without horses.”3 Of course, the man’s father thought this was 
preposterous and mocked Evans. Not only was Evans correct in his prediction, but the 
conviction he displayed was reminiscent of a growing attitude among antebellum 
 
2 Ernest M. Fisher, quoted in Greg Hise, Magnetic Los Angeles: Planning the Twentieth Century 
Metropolis (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 1. In a related observation, regarding 
the location of industrial settlements specifically, a pair of authors notes that industries often sprung up near 
larger metropolitan regions or medium-sized regional cities. They were part of a “knife-edge” phenomenon 
that explains regional growth as jetting out from an already existing center due to the availability of skilled 
labor and resource availability. This is applicable to industrial villages such as DuPont’s because the 
company had similar reasons for locating its business near Wilmington, and its personal growth was part of 
the city and region’s larger urban development. Michael Storper and Richard Walker, The Capitalist 
Imperative: Territory, Technology, and Industrial Growth (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1989), 75.   
3 Elizabeth Montgomery, Reminiscences of Wilmington (Wilmington, Del., 1872), 15. 
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innovators and producers. America’s capitalist culture motivated individuals to expand 
the scale of production, design new goods, and engineer speedy ways for these goods to 
travel and reach markets. Driven by this mindset, Evans’ hope for future advancements 
was part of a widening sentiment that equated America’s national development with 
economic growth and technological achievement. 
 Individual industries and entrepreneurs occupied a strong role at the forefront of a 
culture that linked industry to economic independence and national development. This 
thesis argues that, the DuPont Company, as one such individual producer, was active in 
efforts to fuse manufacturing with national prosperity. The company also helped to 
secure support for American industries, so that they might survive their fragile nascent 
years with stronger prospects for success. DuPont built its name and reputation so that in 
short time it became “synonymous with gunpowder.”4 The company’s founders also 
cultivated a close relationship with the federal government and sought to achieve 
economic protections for all manufactures by serving in the Society of the State of 
Delaware for the Promotion of American Manufactures. Through these efforts, the 
DuPont family and company, along with many others in the northern and middle states 
and parts of the south, helped secure tariffs and other protective measures, thereby 
turning America’s political economy away from its earlier free-trade ideologies.5  
 
4 Gavin Weightman, The Industrial Revolutionaries: The Making of the Modern World, 1776-1914 (New 
York: Grove Press, 2007), 87. 
5 Daniel Walker Howe addresses the popular acceptance of tariffs in the early nineteenth-century by region. 
He notes that New England needed to industrial due to poor soils and a short growing season, and the 
growth of textile mills in there encouraged protectionist sentiments. As, this paper argues, tariffs were of 
course important in the middle states as well where mills dotted the landscape especially outside Baltimore, 
Philadelphia, and Wilmington. Howe also suggests that the South did not support these tariffs because they 
diminished demand on southern cotton. There were, however, three “islands of protectionist sentiment” in 
the South, including: “the sugarcane growers in Louisiana, [Henry] Clay’s hemp growers in Kentucky and 
Missouri, and the Appalachian valleys of eastern Tennessee and western North Carolina, where the 
predominately non-slaveholding population continued to hope for industrial development of their natural 
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DuPont’s growth and the rise of other manufacturing companies highlighted the 
emergence of industrial capitalism in nineteenth-century America. The culture that 
propelled these groups linked industry to national prosperity and unleashed development 
in certain directions. As DuPont’s story suggests, the company was active in assisting 
development nationally, regionally, and locally. By producing powder for the federal 
government and defending manufacturing, it aided national stability and economic 
independence. Regionally, DuPont created markets for its powder in neighboring urban 
centers thereby boosting shipping and commerce in those local economies. Additionally, 
its powder was used to blast rocky areas and form canals to open up internal navigation. 
Finally, DuPont’s footprint, and that of other industrial institutions, was perhaps most 
profound on a local scale. The company’s working environment organized the economic 
and social lives of workers and their families and transformed the natural world around it. 
Its growth added to Wilmington’s, and as the company extended its landholdings and 
boundaries it became ever more a part of that city. This final point is continually relevant 
as the company maintains its headquarters in Wilmington and preserves its initial factory 
site in the form of the Hagley Museum and Library.      
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resources and water power.” Therefore, support for tariff protections in the early nineteenth-century 
existed, at least partially, throughout much of the United States. Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God 
Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 272-
273.  
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